

# Language and the Rationalization of Culture: Discourse and Apparatuses of Development

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## Abstract

Language as a cultural concept is not simply being understood as a ‘medium’ of representation of the world, but more importantly an inherent part of human thinking, discourse and practice. Development—despite its pragmatic connotation—is a particular form of discourse and practice. As a form of discourse, development systematically involves a practice of thinking, production of knowledge and exercise of power in changing and transforming the world. Language is one of important elements of discourse, through which man produces thoughts, concepts, formulas and knowledge that are greatly demanded in development. In addition, since development is generally understood as a systematic and ‘rational’ process of changing the condition of life, a particular kind of “rational language” is especially needed: the language of logics, scientific and objectivity. It is through rational or scientific culture that we can produce plans, designs, and road maps in development. Yet, this is not to say that “rationality” is the sole language of development. A particular ‘irrational’ or even ‘mystical’ language can be identified in various discourses of development. Hence, development must be seen as a blend of rational and irrational languages, in order to create the ‘truth’ of the world.

**Keywords:** Language, Discourse, Culture, Rationality, Development

## 1. Introduction

Language is one of important elements of development, since development is not simply understood as a physical process of exploration of material things to improve the living condition, but also an abstract process of generation and dissemination of ideas in a wider social and cultural context. The ‘thought’ dimensions of development: ideas, concepts, philosophies, knowledge, strategies, tactics and techniques can only be socially distributed or disseminated through language, either oral, written, bodily or visual. Thus, there is no development without the power of language in its very process.

Put the other way around, language is a ‘product’ of social practice, where the use of language in certain discourse—its vocabulary, grammar, form, the choice of words and intonation—is the reflection of social structure. As a social practice, the structure of language is reflection of a social structure. Somewhat in the way grammar consists of rules for the generation of meanings, grammar of culture consists of rules for the generation of cultural meanings in a particular society. In other words, there is a kind of ‘mutual-determination’ between language and culture. On the one hand, language shapes human mind and knowledge system; on the other, language is the ‘product’ of social and cultural systems.

From the viewpoint of development, language has a basic social function, that is, a symbolic medium in generation, dissemination and exchange of ideas or knowledge about development at the level of society. Yet, since knowledge is a subject of competition and struggle among social groups, it is also a subject of power relation among the groups. No matter how objective knowledge may be, it is always the subject of social struggle for its mastering and control. Being the subject of domination and power relation, the ‘truth’ behind the knowledge is not so much the product of scientific arguments of truth, as the product of dominant power and its interests.

The focus of this paper is not so much on a “system of language” as it is on a “practice of language”, that is, language as an event or social use. As an essential part of social practice, language is a kind of “apparatus” that determines, shapes, or controls gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses in a society. In a more specific way, language is an “hegemonic apparatus” in the relation between “the ruler” and “the ruled”: it controls consciousness, shapes minds, models opinions and orients behavior. In other words, language is an extension of power, through which dominant idea or ideology is socially reproduced.

## 2. Language and Development

Development is not simply understood as the exploration of material resources to produce a physical world, but also non-material enterprises of generating ideas, concepts, thoughts, meanings and knowledge. To put it differently, development is a cultural practice aimed at attaining a better living condition, both in material and non-material aspects of culture. Language is an essential element of both aspects of culture, through which ideas, thoughts, ideals, desires and imaginations are generated, disseminated and manifested in the material worlds: highways, buildings, aircrafts, hand phones and other consumer goods.

As a mental process, development’ is a “creative” process of changing the condition of life

both in material and non-material senses: mindset, ethos, character, intelligence, and sensibility. In its wider sense, ‘development’ is defined as the “. . . using the productive resources of society to improve the living conditions of the poorest people.” (Peet, 1999). ‘Improvement’ means a change from a particular condition towards the better one. It is through development that all desires, ideals, utopia and imaginations are realized. Inherent in the concept of development are plans, maps, designs or blue prints, which can be socially communicated and disseminated through language.

Being the essential part of social practice, development can also be understood as a language phenomenon, since the language paradigm is employed in all its processes. It is in the cultural sense that development is understood as “. . . the ensemble of social process by which meanings are produced, circulated and exchanged.” (Thwaites et al., 1994). This is because the ultimate end of development is a meaningful life. As also remarked by Hall, that “. . . all cultural phenomena include some linguistic component and that processes of linguistic perception are involved in cultural analysis” (Hall, Hobson, Lowe, & Willis, 1987). It is why that language can be seen as the very “. . . foundation for culture as it is made of the same material: structural relations, systems of difference, signs and relations of exchange” (Coward & Ellis, 1977).

It becomes very clear from the above argument that development is a social process of “production of meanings”, particularly the refinement of the ‘meaning of life’. The foundations of ‘meaning’ itself are beliefs, philosophies, values, and knowledge inherent in certain culture. Yet, these “ideological” aspects of culture cannot be inferred through direct observation, but from behaviour, speech or other interactions in different social situation (Kaplan & Manners, 1972). In other words, ideology can only be inferred from symbolic system of the society, particularly language. This diagnosis leads to a conclusion that development is a form of ideology, since it encompasses ideas, beliefs, philosophies and symbolic forms.

As a fundamental element of human existence, language is not simply understood as a specific form of representation of the world, but the very basic element of human life itself. Here, language systems are not only “. . . systems for reproducing ideas; they actually shape our ideas, guiding our mental activity and our analyses of our impressions” (Howell & Vitter, 1976). To put it differently, consciousness, behavior and action are conditioned by language. The structure of language determines the structure of the mind, behavior and action. As the grammar of language consists of rules or codes for the production of meaning, a grammar of culture consists of rules for the generation of patterns of behavior.

To put the argument further, it can be argued that language is part of “human nature”, in the sense, that it is the ‘product’ of human natural setting. It is a “. . . component of the human mind, physically represented in the brain and part of the biological endowment of the species. . . . its ultimate aim is to characterize a central component of human nature, defined in a biological setting” (Chomsky, 2002). In other words, language is a ‘capacity’, ‘competence’ and critical component of “creativity”, because humans can “. . . express their thoughts in novel and limitless ways . . . (of) what we may call “the creative aspect of

language use” (Comsky, 2002). Language is a precondition for creativity, since new ideas or concepts can only be mediated through language.

Concerning ideology as an essential element of culture, we have several meanings of this term. Ideology is generally understood as “. . . a system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group, a system of illusory beliefs—false ideas or false consciousness—which can be contrasted to true or scientific knowledge, and the general process of the production of meanings and ideas” (Williams, 1977). It can be resumed from the above definitions, that ideology is a system of meaning constructed in human consciousness, and manifested in social practices. In other words, ideology is the way in which “. . . a subject is produced in language able to represent his/herself and therefore able to act in the social totality, the fixity of those representations being the function of ideology” (Coward & Ellis, 1977).

If we specifically look at the second meaning of ideology as a system of illusory beliefs or false ideas, we can clearly see that, in its ‘negative’ connotation, ideology means “the construction of false ideas” in the socio-cultural practice, including development. Hence, ideology represents not a system of real relations but ‘imaginary relations’ of individuals to their real conditions of existence. As far as development is concerned, these “false ideas” are produced by a dominant group to control the condition of life of others. For example, the “false ideas” about “developmentalism”, a belief that the only steps that can guide a society to progress is a linear mode of development: “the traditional society, the pre-conditions for the take-off, the take-off, the drive to maturity, and the age of high mass-consumption” (Munoz, 1982).

It can be argued furthermore, that as a form of ideology, development is a social process of producing “subjects”, namely, concrete individuals with certain ideas in their consciousness, whether the idea of “freedom”, “prosperity”, “equality”, “communality” or “individualism”, as foundations of their social identity. As remarked by Althusser (1976), “there is no ideology except for concrete subjects, and this destination for ideology is only made possible by the subject: meaning, by the category of the subject and its functioning”. Because development is for individuals in society, it must “interpellate” them as concrete subjects, by seducing them to be part of development ideas or concepts.

But it is important to stress that, because there are different ideas, beliefs or ideologies that compete in seducing human consciousness, development can be seen as a field of the struggle for position and domination. Furthermore, since it is a way of producing a meaningful world, “. . . ideology does not cover just the rudiments of knowledge, ideas, and so on, but also extends to myths, symbols, taste, style, fashion, and the whole ‘way of life’ of a particular society” (Hadjinicolaou, 1973). It is in this sense that development is seen as the struggle for building or maintaining a national identity, which is manifested through architectures, objects, symbols, styles, fashions and arts.

It is in this context of the struggle for ideas, meanings and identities that some external power is seen as a serious threat to the unity and continuity of national identity. A recent trans-national competition in claiming various national cultural heritages—*batik*, *keris*,

*wayang*, *rendang*, *reog* performance—has provoked some regional conflicts, for example a long conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia. The claims are seen as a form of ‘cultural robberies’ that threaten national cultural properties and identities. In addition, various outside cultures, life-styles and symbolic forms are also seen as a threat for the unity of national culture:

“ . . . Indonesia is not only confronted by various ideologies and problems caused by the coming of sciences and technologies, but also outside cultures in general with all patterns and lifestyles they introduce. This circumstance produces various effects in Indonesian society. In certain part of social strata, particularly the stratum with a good economic capacity, authority and opportunity to control economic resources, a conspicuous lifestyle grows. This attitude is facilitated by a sense of inferiority to all things originated from outside, a degradation of moral sensibility, and be deceived by materialism. This form of life gradually diminishes national consciousness of society, causes the decline of national integrity and the shallowness in the experience of religious, ethical and social norms. This means the dispersal in national identity” (LIPI, 1978).

However, it cannot be claimed either that the development is a sterile process free of external influences—ideas, forms, concepts, theories, styles, systems. In contrast, development must be seen as continuous criticisms and efforts to make a synthesis from outside (global) and inside (tradition) elements in order to construct the national identity in the frame of “unity in plurality” (Alisjahbana, 1975). In other words, development must be seen as a complex process of “cultural exchange”, through which outside cultures, lifestyles and symbolic forms have to be appropriated through a complex mechanism of selection, refinement, filtering, synthesizing and exploration, which can enrich national culture and identity.

## **2. Discourse of Development**

As has been argued previously, development involves not only the exploration of material resources to produce a physical world, but also a “language space”, in which ideas, concepts, thoughts, systems are communicated, disseminated and exchanged among relevant subjects. We call development at the level of language or symbolic production, dissemination and exchange a “discourse of development”. It is through discourse that the reality, utopia or imagined world are discussed, debated, communicated, socialized or challenged even denied before it is produced, constructed or realized.

The “discourse of development” is an essential part of development itself, as a language practice through which ideas of development are socially discussed. Before things are physically realized in the development—highway, monorail, mall, monument—certain public discourses are normally conducted in a public sphere to discuss its policy, objective and meanings. Foucault (1989) called this a “discursive practice” that produced “. . . a body of statements regulated by certain rules, in a particular time-space, in a given social, economic, geographical, or linguistic area”. Here, a particular statement, idea, concept, philosophy or meaning appear in a particular space-time rather than another.

As far as reality is concerned, discourse is a way that “. . . makes reality available to us. This

reality, however, is not the unstructured reality out there; it is a reality that we, the member of a discourse community, have constructed for ourselves. In many ways, it will not be totally at odds with the external reality” (Teubert, 2010). Hence, discourse is not about reality itself, but a ‘version’ of reality. The external reality and the ‘reality’ constructed in the discourse are not the same things, because each has its own rules. To put it more precisely, discourse is “. . . an assembly of conceptualizations of concrete and abstract objects, properties, states, processes and actions that owe their existence to foregoing negotiations forming the residue of our memories” (Teubert, 2010).

Discourse is a social practice of producing a text, which consists of socially shared meanings and values in a particular situation and social context. Because of its social character, discourse is governed by “. . . a set of rules prescribing the conditions for production and reception of meanings; which specify who can claim to initiate (produce, communicate) or know (receive, understand) meanings about what topics under what circumstances and with what modalities (how, when, why)” (Hodge & Kress, 1988). In other words, statement in discourse is essentially shaped by the ‘power relation’ and ‘subject position’ in the structure of discourse: a “questioning subject”, “listening subject”, “seeing subject”, “seen subject” or “observing subject” (Foucault, 1989).

No matter how asymmetrical power relations in a given discourse may be, there always remains ‘knowledge’ produced, in whatever form, context, level or function. Yet, this knowledge “. . . can be part of discourse if it has possibilities of use and appropriation offered by discourse” (Foucault, 1989). For example, an “academic discourse” in a university produces scientific knowledge, as an objective and scientific knowledge; whereas “religious discourse” produces ‘subjective’ knowledge, for example, about the existence of God, which cannot be proved empirically. The “discourse of development”, on the other hand, produces at the same time a rational, practical and social knowledge.

As has by now become very clear, all discourses produce texts, knowledge and meanings, through language and other symbolic forms. Languages and symbols are essential elements in any discursive practice. To put it differently, language is one of important ‘apparatuses’, which determines the discursive practice. Agamben (2009) defines ‘apparatus’ as:

“. . . anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviours, opinions, or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures, and so forth. . . but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and—why not—language itself, which is perhaps the most ancient of apparatuses—one in which thousands and thousands of years ago a primate inadvertently let himself be captured, probably without realizing the consequences that he was about to face.”

It can be seen from the above definition that language is one of the important apparatuses, which determines, orients, controls consciousness, behaviour or action. Apparatus, according to Foucault (1980), is an “. . . heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements,

philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions. . . the system of relations that can be established between these elements”. Language is also an essential ‘apparatus’ of development, which determines its model of interaction, communication, negotiation, exchange and transaction of ideas, concepts and knowledge.

Nevertheless, since language is an essential part of society, the use of language in certain discursive practice is essentially shaped by various cultural backgrounds: an ideology, morality, custom, or religious belief. We can obviously identify this cultural background in the discourse of development in Indonesia, which is acknowledged as one of the ‘religious’ country. No matter how secular a given development may be, religious doctrines remain to be claimed as the essential backgrounds of the discourse of development. As clearly remarked by Koentjaraningrat (1992):

“Persuasion and information is another way that must be intensified by communicators and mass media experts. It is the time to intensify the implementation of the development campaign. In this sense, it is not gigantic posters with empty slogans about development that have to be multiplied, but the persuasion capabilities of religious sides. But, don’t be misunderstood, and suspected that I will use religion as propaganda! Not at all; but I believe, that in all religions there are doctrines that encourage man to work hard, to live in an economical and simple life, a disciplined and responsible life.”

As can be clearly seen from the argument, religious values are essential basis of the discourse of development, as its transcendental foundations. Religious values of hard work, discipline, ascetic, honest, consistent and simple life are the ‘true’ spirit of development as it is understood by Weber. However, the religious doctrine can also be the subject of ‘discursive manipulation’ by certain individual, group, or ruling class. Religious doctrines are artificially manipulated in various social, political and economic discourses as a legitimating basis for certain policy, strategy or plan, so that they are accepted as a form of ‘public consent’.

### **3. Language, Power and Irrationality**

The analysis of the role of language and other apparatuses in a discourse makes possible a new understanding of discourse as a form of social practice. Put the other way around, the social structure of a society determines the structure of the discourse. One of the central relations in the social context is “power relation”, which shapes the practice of language, the choice of words, the vocabulary, the intonation, the body language, the gesture and other forms of language expression. One cannot say the same words, express the same intonation and use the same body language in different power relations of discourse.

It is in this context that Foucault clearly sees the role of power in shaping discourse. Central to Foucault argument is that power is a concrete thing exercised to the concrete body. As remarked by Foucault (1977), “In becoming the target for new mechanism of power, the body is offered up to new forms of knowledge. It is the body of exercise, rather than of speculative physics; a body manipulated by authority. . .”. The body is subject to a ‘disciplinary’ mechanism of certain power system, that is, a mechanism of controlling the body through certain instruments, observation, examination or training. It is in this sense, that

discipline must be seen as an important mechanism in the development.

It can be argued further, that in a way the language use in a discourse is the ‘effect’ of a complex power relation, the ‘knowledge’ and ‘truth’ it produces is the ‘effect’ of the same relation. It is in this sense that different discourses never produce the same ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’ about the same ‘reality’. In other words, discourses are “plural” in their character, where we can have different ‘versions’ of knowledge and truth about a single reality, depended on the power relation, subject position and the situation of discourse. This is because, according to Foucault (1980):

“each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true”.

As can be seen from the argument, the ‘truth’ about things in a particular discursive situation is highly depended on who has the power and the authority to speak, in what political situation and social setting. For example, in the discourse of development during the totalitarian regime of New Order in Indonesia, the president had an ‘absolute’ power and authority to speak about all things, to interpret all realities, to judge all actions and events, and to define the ‘truth’ about all aspects of everyday life.

It is in this sense, that language can also be seen as an important element in the concept of “hegemony”. Hegemony is a principle of power relation among social classes, as a way of domination, particularly by a ruling class (Williams, 1977). Yet, for Gramsci, the domination is nothing to do with mass or military force, but with a site of “cultural domination”. As remarked by Gramsci (1991), hegemony “. . . manifests in two ways, as “domination” and as “intellectual and moral leadership”. In other words, hegemony is a form of domination of public consciousness through dominant ideas, to gain public consent. This mechanism of domination of consciousness is also an important element in the discourse of development.

Nevertheless, it can be easy to find a sort of cultural domination produced through a rather ‘distorted’ power mechanism, of what is called by Bourdieu (1990) “symbolic violence”, that is, “. . .the gentle, invisible form of violence, which is never recognized as such, and is not so much undergone as chosen, the violence of credit, confidence, obligation, personal loyalty, hospitality, gifts, gratitude, piety—in short, all the virtue honoured by the code of honour—cannot fail to be seen as the most economical mode of domination”. Here, an ‘authority’ is illegally exercised in discourse to manipulate and control the ‘truth’. Accordingly, the ‘truth’ itself is the very effect of ‘violence’, in a way that it is formulated through forces, in a gentle ways that the violence is unrecognized as such.

In many occasions, a ruler enforcedly uses his authority to interpret or judge realities through discourse. This is because, according to Bourdieu (1997), language is a form of symbolic power. As remarked by Bourdieu, “symbolic power” is the “. . . invisible power . . . a power of constructing reality, and one which tends to establish a gnoseological order: the immediate

meaning of the world. . .” There are various sources of power: material things, symbols, charisma, mystic or other supernatural sources.

Mysticism is one of the central sources of power in the context of development in Indonesia, which can be identified in the use of language in various discourses. The practice of mysticism in Javanese culture, according to Mulder (1985), is “. . . a self effort towards self-consciousness through the constitution of a strong inner power. All these can guide to a belief that he is given guidance by revelation and the true reality (*kasunyatan*) that inspiring life and all his activities”. This mystical content, for example, is intensively used by the president Soeharto in his personal, formal or public speaking. As remarked by Soeharto (1989):

“Based on our ancestor heritages, mysticism is a way of approaches to God, to make our inner-self closer to Him. It is partly based on the knowledge of *kasunyatan* (true reality) knowledge of *sangkan paraning dumadi*, (an origin and final destination of man) and knowledge of *kasampurnaning hurip* (perfection of life). This is the true mysticism.”

The relation of the “ruler” and the “ruled” in the Javanese concept of democracy is a complex paternalistic relation as inculcated in the Javanese philosophy. As remarked by Mulder, “it is the living sites for the ruler to show his superiority through self control. Because of this control he can give moral and material protection (*pengayoman*) for his followers (*anak buah*) who must accept his leadership and honor him, because it is a duty of their life. The ruler is supposed to have more knowledge, to be paternal, and pays attention to them. He has to be compassionated (*tepa slira*) to the depended people, to inspire, and at the same time gives them anxiety and trust (*wedi asih*)” (Mulder, 1985). As the holder of ‘absolute’ power, Soeharto (1989) puts himself paternally as a model, ideal or standard for public behavior, thinking and morality:

“I am the son of a poor farmer. But, my father always reminded me to honor parents all the time. I always be reminded to *mikul dhuwur mendhem jero* (to bear as higher as possible, to hide as deep as possible; to honor) parents.”

The mystical content and the position of self as a cultural ideal are two main attributes of the discourse of the regime of New Order. As a consequence, the relation of language exchange in discourse is asymmetrical in its character. This is because the power relation itself in discourse is asymmetrical, which produces a disciplined, docile or submissive subject. In this ‘totalitarian’ model of discourse there is no place for a ‘critical’ or ‘creative’ subject as portrayed by Chomsky. The subject has no right whatsoever to say what he/she want to say. It is the ruler that has an absolute right to ‘decide’ what has to be said, in what occasion and and place, and through what kind of language expression.

#### **4. The Discourse of Democracy**

The coming of reformation and democratization at the level of political ideology has changed radically the discourse of development in Indonesia. Reformation as an era of freedom and openness has given spaces for a more freedom of speech and expression. This influences public discourse, which has been more dynamic, open, but in certain ways distortive and

manipulative. To put it differently, the discourses of development in the democratic era of Indonesia has produced statements that are rich in forms, styles and repertoires but with “distortive” or even “empty meanings”.

As “freedom” becomes a ‘magic word’ in the reformation era, it is also a very basis of all public discourses, particularly the discourse of development. Paradoxically, it is this same “freedom” that is intriguingly manipulated by certain political elites to produce a “free statements” in discourse. Here, the “discursive space” is intensively manipulated to perform a particular ‘language game’, through which realities are manipulated in discursive practice to produce a ‘pseudo-truth’. The regime of truth, to borrow from Foucault, is ironically manipulated and distorted in the name of “freedom”.

Here, democracy is by no means a sphere, in which the regime of truth is objectively constructed, but the sphere of the distortion of truth through language games. For the basic idea of democracy as “the power of people” is distorted, so that the word “people” become an empty word, drained with meaning. The discourse of democracy is actually the sites “. . .for the elite to exercise power de facto, and to do so in the name of the people that representation is obliged to recognize. . .” (Ranciere, 2006). In other words, democracy is but an excess or scandal, in which language as a signifier is distorted to create what is called by Laclau (2007) an “empty signifier”, where a concept cannot be distinguished from its contrast: true/false, moral/amoral, or good/evil.

These “empty signifiers” can easily be identified in many public discourses, particularly political campaign. An example of statement can give us an idea about this empty signifier:

“The voice of Golkar, the voice of people!!!: the voice of people can be put as a true basis and sign for the attendants of the National Conference of the Golkar Party, 5-9 October 2009 in Pekanbaru, Riau, to determine who is the leader of Golkar Party for the next five years.”

The word “people” here is an empty signifier, in the sense that it does not represent the Golkar party: the voice of the party *is not* the representation of the voice of people! This is only a ‘claim’ of representativeness with empty meaning. Another statement from different party give us another idea about the word “people” as an empty signifier: “Together we could” or “Together we get on”. As can be seen from these statements, the term “people” is manipulated as the “other” represented in discourse of development, but is actually an “hollow word”, which has no relation whatsoever to their true reality.

As interestingly remarked by Ranciere, the word “people” is always uttered, counted or represented in discourses, but “people” themselves as concrete entities never have a real right to speak, to actualize their real existence. As remarked by Ranciere (2010), “the people is a supplementary existence that inscribes the count of the uncounted, or part of those who have no part—that is, in the last instance, the equality of speaking beings without which inequality itself is inconceivable”. In other words, people have a legal right to speak in discourse, but there is no “real” sphere to speak. They are, in contrast, the very “objects” of discourse: the crowd who are represented, discussed, judged and named. They have a genuine right to speak,

but they cannot use this right.

“People” are treated as a “name” with no real power. They have no qualification to speak, to express their desire, so that, they are politically represented by parliament. In other word, the concept of “the power of people” is merely an “empty signifier” with no relation whatsoever with the real condition of people. Ironically, a relation of representative and the people represented, which is normally a relation of resemblance, in discourse it becomes a binary relation: a two parts set as opposites. As remarked by Bobbio (1996), that “. . . the two parts are axiological opposites, because if you attribute a positive value to one of them, then the other necessarily assumes a negative value”. A statement of a chief of parliamentary in a public discourse can give us an idea about this binary form of discourse:

“Do not include people in the discussion about the construction of a new building; it is only the elites, intelligent experts that can be invited to discuss this matter”.

Here, the signifier “people” is used by their representative in a way that negates its very meaning, substance and existence. The true meaning of democracy is the way that people has a genuine power to speak, to discuss and to judge a particular issue in the public sphere. This is why public sphere is an important element of democracy. The exclusion of people in a public discourse means the negation of the very foundation of democracy itself.

Furthermore, as public sphere is more and more dominated by capitalist elites, as political and economic spheres become one and the same thing, the public discourse become a merely “excess” of the capitalist model of discourse. This type of discourse, according to Ranciere (2006), is “. . . a being of excess, an insatiable devourer of commodities, human rights and televisual spectacles, that the capitalist law of profit rules the planet”. Here, the political slogan “Together we could” can be seen as an excessive effect of the capitalist model of discourse, which has shaped political discourses, with the intensive use of a manipulative image, persuasion, trick, rhetoric and popular language to control consciousness.

## 5. Conclusions

Several clues have already been provided from the previous discussions, that the change of political regime has altered the model of public discourse, particularly the discourse of development. The formation of discourse, the apparatuses of culture, the power relation, the relation of hegemony, the position of subject, the body of knowledge, the regime of truth, the foundation of ideology, and the structure of public sphere—all determine the statements and language use in discourse. The more democratic the regime, the more “free” language used in its public discourse, but the more arduous the production of ‘truth’.

The change from a totalitarian regime of discourse to a more democratic one is by no means a mirror of the transformation in the regime of truth. Far from being simply the proponent, the democratic regimes in many places are the true *simulacreur* of ‘truth’. Both totalitarian and democratic regimes manipulate ‘truth’, although may be different in their tactics and strategies. In the public discourse of totalitarian regime, people are ‘deceived’ through illusion, false ideas and consciousness, with the support of military and physical power. In the discourse of democratic regime, people are also ‘deceived’ through the same illusion, false

ideas and false consciousness, but through the tricks of language game in the name of “freedom”. Whereas in the former, the states apparatuses are mobilized to protect the ‘truth’; in the later, the ‘truth’ is ‘protected’ through the domination of media.

As a conclusion, because development is ideological in its very character, the change in the form of government from the totalitarianism to democracy is in principle has changed the character of apparatuses: language, media, parliament, military, prison, court, police, or school. The language of a totalitarian regime, which was binary, asymmetrical and paternalistic, has been totally changed in the democratic regime to be a more open, symmetrical and individualistic. But, this is not so say that the structure of “knowledge” and “truth” of the discourse has also fundamentally been changed. The practice of deceiving consciousness in various democratic discourses through various forms of illusions, false images and artificiality, remains the very basis of public discourse [ ]

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