

Influencing Factors of Political Development of Iran, 1953-1979

Maryam Karimi

Faculty of Human Ecology, University Putra Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur , Malaysia

Maryam4791@gmail.com

Assoc. Prof. Dr. Sarjit Singh Darshan Singh (Corresponding author)

Faculty of Human Ecology, University Putra Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur , Malaysia

sarjit@putra.upm.edu.my

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Abstract

This article is going to review the major factors of political development in Iran. Political development process had been a new concept usable in twentieth century. So, Iran is one of those societies which were going to change in political thoughts. In this article, researcher reviews the capabilities of political system in Iran. In the next part, the factors of political development have been realized response of political elites who do reaction to developments and make changes in context of the society upon Iran. In the third part, analyzing of Iran's political development illustrates the barriers of political development in Iran since 1953 to 1979. In the last part the article concludes that the process of political development was affected by the common sense rose up from society context of Iran by these important factors.

Keywords: Political development; Iran; factors

1. Introduction

Iranian history is often presented as the struggle of freedom and democracy as factors of political development against the authoritarian governments in twentieth century. To have a better understanding of political development in Iran and to clarify the role of government in affecting the political development in Iran, we need to assess political fluctuations and capabilities in the political system of this country. Meanwhile the World Wars had ended and the theme of democracy and political development and liberal aspirations spread in the world. Political development continued its own path even in the face of challenging and sometimes, adverse conditions.

As Pye (1966) believes the political development is “adjustment between old patterns of life and new demands”, so, there should be changes but for Iran these changes should take place from within the political system. The study of performance and capabilities of political system has a direct effect on the process of political development. Deficiencies in the functioning of the system are viewed as being the consequence of lack of administrative efficiency, corruption or impacts of forces from outside of political system. This is led, did these capabilities influence on political development process by change demands influence on inputs and outputs of political system?

To obtain a clear view of political development in Iran, this article returned to the pre-modernization of Iran. As many other countries, there has been many reasons to bring political development but it depends on the religion, culture, tradition and other influenced factors. In political history of Iran, the Pahlavi monarch has had ideas of political development and apparently would like to promote factors of political development; raising capabilities of political system, pave the path to political elites to make good response to political needs but it was only in theory.

The Iran's monarch at that time had liberal beliefs. But, his priority was economic development and he could not create balance between political development factors and economic development factors. In fact, there has been happened uneven development.

In the next part the article explains how political elites could response to necessities of political system related to monarch and society as well. In new era, political elites had new aims and plans. They launched movements to progressive socio-economic and political reforms and new ways of solving political problems. Repressive control over elites and intellectuals was an absolute hindrance for political progress in Iran. In the next part it is the barriers of political development that the article analyzed Iran's political development through these barriers as king's power tools. Particularly, these barriers of political development of Iran started often in 1953 that Iranian regime of Pahlavi had implemented severe repressive policies under many different programs to control political movements by different social and political parties.

2. Major Factors of Political Development

To have a better understanding of political development in Iran and to clarify the role of Mohammad Reza Shah in affecting the political development in Iran, we need to study political fluctuations and capabilities in the political system of this country. As Zonis (1971) states, “Iran has been called the oldest of the new nations” and it is a great country with famous historical background in political and social levels and an honorable culture which had always succeeded in avoiding to being colonized. In the twentieth century, before the coup of 1953, the Pahlavi monarch put forward his the progressive plan at the socio-economic level. During the father, Reza Shah's reign, the people were suppressed under the government's strict laws but he was deposed by the British and Russians and exiled to Mauritius in 1941 and his powers were transferred to his son the Pahlavi II-Mohammad Reza Shah- who was just 21 years old at that time (Binder, 1962). Meanwhile the World Wars had ended and the theme of democracy and political development and liberal aspirations spread in the world. Political development continued its own path even in the face of challenging and sometimes, adverse conditions. Significant political development was

accomplished in Iran from 1941 to 1949 (Binder 1962, Zonis 1971).

Apparently, the people were disenchanted due to the severe rule of the Reza Shah. So his son tried to adopt a softer approach. Meanwhile, the rapidly growing socialist movement appeared between the years of 1941 till 1949 when it created some parties and movements, such as the Hezb-e-Tudeh (Party of the Masses) led by Iraj Eskandari who was influenced by the socialist and communist movement in Europe. After the socialist movement, there was created a nationalist movement led by Dr. Mohammad Mosaddiq during 1949-1953 (Abrahamian 1982).

The period of real challenge of Iran's monarchy had begun with its people and elites. After the military coup of 1953 and stepping down of Prime Minister Dr. Mosaddiq, Iran's monarch started employing the method of his father, as a dictator. Demands for more rights and freedom for the elites and parties and media were put an end. Actually his will was to influence and promoted the socio-economic development but in fact there was more of constriction in the political atmosphere in the country. The point is Mohammad Reza Shah used the military, bureaucracy and court patronage system as three pillars to keep his power-not for the people's satisfaction. He cooperated with business entities of foreign states and neglected the progress of political development factors to complete his own development plan. Anyway, political system and its capabilities to reach the goals of democracy, welfare and stability became ineffective. As a result of his inability to handle the developmental strategy, it undermined the legitimacy of his monarchy especially after 1953 coup and much more important than the capabilities of political system could not work out to solution of political development problems.

2.1 The Capabilities of Political System in Iran

The study of performance or capabilities of political system has a direct effect on the process of political development. Almond and Powell (1966) described some capabilities of political system such as extractive, regulative, distributive, symbolic, responsive, domestic and international capabilities; most of these capabilities were proved in political systems too. Usually, the three sources of political change - elites, domestic environment and international environment - interact with one another. These sources in turn, may change demands influence on inputs and outputs of political system. Also, change in content may be stimuli to political change (Almond and Powell 1966).

After the 1953 coup, the Pahlavi monarch who was afraid of losing his power, relied on the idea that he must control the country by promoting his military power and he started at full speed the drive to expand the three pillars that held up his monarchy power: the military, the bureaucracy and the court patronage system. It was the beginning of the part of his rule where he started following in the footsteps of his father and to deny political development in practice. Apparently he needed to consolidate his power. He reshuffled the government, including the prime minister' post and military governor of Tehran whom he chose from military forces too (Bashiriyeh 1984).

He got financial help from the United States to develop confidence of himself among the trading society. Right after the four years following the coup of 1953, there was not much thought about political development, and the Shah established a secret police named SAVAK that used martial laws and military forces to help him reach his goals. This article has mentioned the first contract between Iran and British in the 1919 Anglo-Iranian Treaty. In this way British loaned £2,000,000 to Iran and helped in the construction of rail road, revision of tariffs, and collection of war compensation from third parties (Abrahamian 2008).

To Lord Curzon, the creator of above treaty, it was very beneficent for Iran. To the Iranian prime minister Mirza Hasan Vossouq Al-Dowleh and his fellow-aristocratic advisors, this agreement would remove some officials and social problems. But on the other hand, to the opposition, the treaty of 1919 was British seen as intrigue to transform Iran into a minion of the British Empire. Mohammad Reza Shah, immediately after getting rid of Mosaddiq and his attempts at oil nationalization, ended the conflict with Britain on oil issues and he

accepted the equal sharing of profits, so, it was the beginning of the second agreement between Iran and a consortium that comprised British Petroleum and eight other European and American oil companies (Abrahamian 1982).

In 1953, General Zahedi who was the coup leader became prime minister of Iran. At that time, Iran was still in the midst of oil nationalization. There was starting of socio-economic development but there existed instability in the political situation of Iran. People in different parts of the society were clamoring for more rights and freedom. Particularly, the National Front (Hezb-e Melli) remained after the overthrowing of Mosaddiq, and he was leader of this party before the time of premiership. The Shah who was worried about this party, tried to control this party and its activists. Because the nation were supporting this party, the Shah decided to have large landed families' representatives in parliament to support his monarchy and on the other hand, he acted against elites and intelligentsia's political development attitudes. Apparently, in this situation the political development was meaningless and had not come into reality (Abrahamian 2008).

By dismissing General Zahedi, Hossein Ala became premier but under his premiership there had not been any changes in political conditions. The King of Iran just was cautious in face of traditional middle class such as prominent religious leaders and he, along with his family were always visiting religious cities for keeping his legitimacy of power. Actually, Mohammad Reza Shah, could have controlled almost the whole country especially the intelligentsia and urban working group classes; moreover he controlled both the Majlis and the Senate in the 1950s.

In fact, to get help to control over the Majlis through the old guard – the Shah used Dr. Manuchehr Eghbal and Assadollah Alam- who were merely 'yes-men' to him. Meanwhile, on the basis of the constitution, the King had the power to veto financial bills, so it weakened any future opposition in parliament. Obviously, when a society had not had rights to oppose injustice, the rulers, step by step would have been moving towards dictatorship. The king of Iran-Mohammad Reza Shah- was taught that the domination over the nation is important but he had forgotten the point that for any successful government there was no way to accept the opposition parties and other social and political classes and their activities too. So, here too the political development was meaningless (Behnoud 1985).

To obtain a clearer view of political development in Iran, we need to return to the pre-modernisation era of Iran. Foran (1998) states, when the Qajar dynasty- the Turkish tribe migrated to the Middle East in the 14th century, they were interested to gain political ground in Iran in the 16th century and helped to install the Safavid family on the Iranian throne. The Qajars tried to consolidate their power and had statewide bureaucracy and also kept their positions through having a strong army and legitimized their dynasty by following the manner of previous emperors of Iran. However, their attempts for creation of a vast bureaucracy had failed. This era of political development was much inferior to that of the Pahlavi reign (Foran 1998).

They were monarchs who considered themselves to be God's representatives on the earth. In theory, the Qajars were potentially omnipotent but practically they were too weak, as regards control over political situation of Iran at that time. They used the strategy of divide and rule to ensure their own survival. Continually, they created groups conflict to keep themselves in power. Assessment of previous rulers showed us they were not going to aid political development in the 19th century. In fact political development is fulfilled in the social, economic and cultural context very slowly at the end of the Qajar reign and it could not be able to fill the vacuum. There had been many other reasons to bring political development in different countries but it depends on the religion, culture, tradition and other influence factors too (Abrahamian 1982).

In this part of the political history of Iran, the Pahlavi monarch had had ideas of political development but only in theory, and not in practice. In this sense, Dr. Manuchehr Eghbal, the Prime Minister in 1957, declared "I have personal distaste for this, the word of 'strike'". As Prime Minister he hated strikes and protests, so, the opposition groups slowly were driven to

underground activities.

Dr. Eqbal described himself as the Shah's household servant and he tried to obey the Shah in every situation. Naturally, in this period of Pahlavi's monarchy there had been emphasis on the economic development much more than political development, till 1960. Actually, the economic crisis occurred despite the Shah's plans of development and he could not continue his dual policy of attracting traditional classes and control over the modern classes by economic means.

At the same time, America pressured Iran for land reforms. The economic crisis had been imminent since 1954, when the government of Iran realized that the oil revenues could not pay for the seven-year-plan of development as well as the escalating military expenditures. He thus resorted to deficit financing and heavy borrowing from abroad (Abrahamian, 2008). In 1960, emerged Sharif Emami, another prime minister of Iran who was close to Germany in his political activities and it was the policy of the Shah at this time to keep away from British and America temporarily. The Shah at that time had to choose the best alliances but he was being warned about enmity with British.

Sharif Emami who graduated from Germany became prime minister after Dr. Eghbal. He had been arrested in the Second World War by the British army. He did not belong to any party. He became unpopular and found himself blamed for adverse reactions in the face of protests from teachers who were demanding for their delayed salaries. It revealed the fact that the Iranian government had constructed its own political structure, whereby there was no freedom for the parties and opposition groups. Obviously, under such circumstances, the opposition political parties and freedom movement groups had no choice but to express their dissent through strikes.

In 1961, after the resignation of Sharif Emami, the Shah had to offer the premiership to Dr. Ali Amini, the American favorite, because he had liberal beliefs. In fact, the Shah was in a bad situation at this period. He used oil money for military expenditure extravagantly but experienced bad crop harvests and financial problems at the same time. The Shah had to borrow from the International Monetary Fund and the USA government, and also had to freeze salaries, and dilute some development plans. Moreover, Shah had to choose the liberal prime minister to prevent the spread of communism in Iran and to implement land reform (Behnoud 1985).

In fact, Iran, as any other developing country should have created correlation in development of political conditions as well as economic and social spheres, but it was not practically possible, without democracy to reach to this goal. Apparently, external pressures and economic crisis had destabilized Pahlavi's regime. So, all of these problems had been raised during strikes among different levels of society and most of them had ended with bloody conflict between strikers and government forces. Some of these protests were fierce, especially those involving election fraud. All these events had caused the Shah to choose Amini, as a liberal Prime Minister to implement some changes temporarily.

Dr. Amini was an imposed selection for the Shah, for the Kennedy administration had pushed the Shah to have this choice. Dr. Amini as a Prime Minister, made decisions his own way (Huntington, 1968). He dissolved the newly elected twentieth Majlis that comprised members of the conservative landlords. He exiled the head of SAVAK out of Iran, and offered to hold discussions with the National Front, changing the Justice Minister and replacing him with a former Tudeh leader who was not a favorite of the Pahlavi Regime. He also handed the Education Ministry to Mohammad Derakhshesh which drew support from the Tudeh and the National Front Parties, while the Agricultural Ministry was entrusted to Hassan Arsanjani, the medical journalist who had been advocating Land Reform (Abrahamian 1982).

In assessment of Iran's political situation, Dr. Amini, in his fourteen months' of premiership, carried out land reforms and instituted the hard measures requested by international Monetary Fund (IMF). Unfortunately, stringent measures increased the people's discontent. He also could not get the full support of the National Front. Moreover, he failed to obtain American

support too and there was disgruntlement about the Shah's spending excessively on the military. Actually the land reform, which will be discussed in the next part, and giving freedom to work and freedom of expression to some parties that were been suppressed by Shah was his contribution to the political development process. Apparently, the Pahlavi Regime had not tolerated Amini just because of achieving its own goals (Hungtington 1968).

In 1962, Mohammad Reza Shah chose Assadolah Alam, the head of the People's Party, to form a government as Prime Minister. Alam's ideas and views were aligned with those of the Shah's goals, so this gave rise to charges of lack of freedom for media and political parties and also of election fraud. Alam created some change in the second stage of the land reform that was seen in the years to come. Arsanjani, the main planner of land reform, aimed to create independent farmers but the Shah's goal was to eliminate sharecroppers and retain the commercial landlords. In the researcher's view, the Shah denied Amini-Arsanjani from proceeding on Land Reform. In other words, these proceedings were going to reinforce capabilities of the political system; making it more regulative, responsive, distributive, and as factors of political development too. But Mohammad Reza Shah changed the path of these proceedings due to his own desire (Abrahamian 2008).

Most important was the fact that the Shah did not consider the uneven development in social, political and economic domains. The different groups of people had not been satisfied with the Shah's plan even with the Shah's White Revolution that was a six-point program of land distribution, nationalization of forests, sale of state factories to private entrepreneurs, profit sharing for industrial workers, extension of the vote to women and establishment of rural literacy corps. With the exit of all of these programs in 1963, thousands of office employees, clergymen, shopkeepers, teachers, unemployed workers and students took to the streets, not only in Tehran but also most big cities in Iran, in protest against the Shah. The upheavals of June 1963 that lasted three full days left thousands of people dead in its wake (Bashiriyeh 2001). Unfortunately he also did not accept facts about bloody upheavals where thousands of people were murdered under his regime. He ironically said in his interview, that there were only a thousand people who had been killed (Pahlavi 1979).

The riots did not spread to other towns and were controlled quickly by military forces. The opposition leaders such as Khomeini, the clergy leader and National Front leaders, were not looking for radical change but moderate reforms. Definitely, the riot's inflammation came down but it remained a potent, smoldering force ready to erupt again at an opportune time. This riot was a point of connection between the 1953 coup and the 1979 revolution. Inevitably, Mohammad Reza Shah did not understand the negative undercurrents that would subsequently lead to the Islamic revolution and his downfall. In the following period of his monarchy, he dominated and controlled the political, social and economic arena, giving free rein to his own ideas. So there were no public political parties that could protest to his plan and no political elites who could advise him and warn him of the lack of freedom and justice in the country (Binder 1962).

Meanwhile Shah assumed that his plan was the best for his people, albeit in the form of a dictatorship regime. It is not possible for the accomplishment of socio-economic development without political development if people could not make decisions for their life and move towards democracy (Bashiriyeh 2001).

In fact the Shah had been humiliated because of Mosaddiq's intelligence, and he tried to choose a Prime Minister whom he could control in order to then fulfill his plans of having a loyal military, and political parties and parliament that were under his control. Accordingly, the issue of political development became the third step for the Pahlavi regime. In such a situation, the Shah administration and his chosen prime ministers inevitably did not pay attention to political development but this was not the end of impacts and irreparable consequences to political development in Iran (Hungtington 1968).

It was a novel thing for the Pahlavi Regime to encounter huge waves of protests and requests for more freedom from Iran's elites and parties. Consequently, just as the Tobacco Crisis of

1892 was a pathway to the Constitutional Revolution of 1906 of Iran, the June 1963 upheaval also became a precursor for the Islamic Revolution of 1979 that had its beginning in the 1953 coup in Iran.

2.2 Response of Political Elites

Iran's political elite group's role and viewpoints had serious consequences to Iranian political development and its barriers. According to G. Mosca in his work, 'The Ruling Class', (1939), Iran's political elite group's role and viewpoints had serious consequences to Iranian "Among the constant facts and tendencies that are to be found in all political organisms, one is so obvious that it is apparent to the most casual eye. In all societies two classes of people appear - a class that rules and a class that is ruled." (Butenschøn, Davis et al. 2000).

So, the political elites lead the masses in a society, and their ideologies are essential to the validity of the political organism. Obviously, in modern times, with the rise of the Nationalist Movement, the elite class also found themselves in a different situation in Iran. Iran of the twentieth century with its mix of socialism, democracy and nationalism had given rise to new elites and intellectuals with new aims and plans. Dr. Mohammad Mosaddiq - the National Front party leader and Prime Minister, Dr. Ali Shariati, Dr. Bani Sadr and Dr. Bazargan and others were the forerunners of these political elites (Abrahamian 2008).

In the twentieth century, the class of educated populace in Iran was widened particularly because of Reza Shah's attempts to modernize Iran in the beginning of the twentieth century. The establishment of Tehran University with Dr. Hesabi as President, also increased the number of Iranians returning from abroad. These political elites made a significant contribution to the growth of nationalism in modern Iran during Mohammad Reza Shah's reign. They launched movements for progressive socio-economic and political reforms. Most of these movements were led by the intellectual class and they propagated new ways of solving political, economic and socio-cultural problems.

Accordingly, in the case of Iran as Bashiriyeh points out, the elite political culture was on the basis of patriarchal culture and rooted in the oriental despotism in Iran. As a result, this created crises, conflicts and similar outcomes in political and socio-economic levels, particularly in the modern state of Mohammad Reza Shah. In the process of political and social development in Mohammad Reza Shah's reign, there had been mass mobilization in political participation in urgent times but there had been less political competition too. Iran was ruled in the twentieth century with the belief that political conflict must be eliminated by political conflict, so, with this viewpoint the word 'compromise' had a negative meaning and this attitude intensified the Iran cultural cleavages. Quite clearly, the cultural cleavages are one of the barriers of political consensus and consequently underdeveloped political development. Moreover, collapse of the traditional society's role in the process of development plans, especially political development in the twentieth century after 1953 had occurred (Bashiriyeh 2001). This study has mentioned that cultural cleavage in Iran is one of the significant elements of political underdevelopment. Saeia (2008) points out, relations between political elites in government and opposition determined the kind and range of democratization that obviously could be a transition to political development (Saeia 2008).

But Iran's Regime, through repressive control over elites and intellectuals, was an absolute hindrance for political progress. The possibility of public and private meetings and activity of intellectuals and elites had been severely restricted by the Pahlavi Regime since the 1953 coup. Freedom of expression that is one of important primary rights for intellectuals had deplorable consequences during any protest and finally oppressed by security forces of SAVAK.

In this regard the regime tried to prove that the thoughts and institutions and culture of a society must change along with whatever socio-economic change, activities and plans that he had for development. He could not understand that it very much depended upon the influence of the intellectuals who were the connecting link between civil society and monarchy. So, in general, it seems that in Iran, the rulers thought about policies more in terms of bringing out

competitors and opposition groups rather than compromise and reconciliation for the better administration and community development. Naturally, political administration in the former idea decreased political competition and participation (Zonis 1971). Presumably, with these circumstances, conditions for political development became weakened and attempts for progress through programs at other levels like socio-economic aspect, also had not succeeded. So, political elites continued their criticism of the regime. To being critical of the Pahlavi Regime or its policies continued to put many intellectuals at risk of unfair arrests, intimidation and jail, they being accused of disrupting public order and opposition of development plans of the monarchy. Everything worsened throughout 1976 until 1979 for political actors in civil society, opposition secular and religious groups till the explosion of people's discontent in the 1979 revolution. It was made clear that the Pahlavi regime denied political parties' rights and the Shah of Iran only accomplished power on the basis of absolute modern monarchy, and of course by oil revenue, his single party and court patronage, the backing of the military and SAVAK, which suppressed political elites and the people in reformists (Abrahamian 1982).

Even so, with pressure of international players such as America, Iran's monarch had to choose a liberal Prime Minister for reform temporarily. To determine the role of these impressive factors on political development in Iran, this article will discuss more to analyze barriers in political development in Iran in the next section.

3. Analyzing Of Iran's Political Development Upon Its Barriers (1953-1979)

Iran's political system was a predominantly traditional one. Basically, the traditional system's characteristic feature is not rational. In spite of Iran's long-range development plan, it had not been built upon a system of priorities but more on a principle of balance. As a matter of fact, this balance had no relation to balanced development but the balance in the various fields of development. Thus it could not yield a sufficient plan to political development. Furthermore, the Shah had nationalizing tendencies to strengthen his position through reinforcing the efficiency of the civil service, and through strengthening the army. Even planned economic development is also a part of getting the traditional privilege. He was basically looking for ways of legitimizing his own power.

It is apparent the plan of political progress ended with Mosaddiq's fall. This period of political development process was a transitional period of some twelve years Iranian intellectuals discovered modern art and they followed the new political tendencies. The world of Marxism-Leninism was opened to their intellectuals and included having a true constitutional government. The desired system was nation-state, to enhance the freedom of thoughts, to render the rationalizing policies. But with the fall of Mosaddiq, who was the true symbol of nationalization, the political development process was also derailed. Apparently the barriers gave rise to numerous problems in this process and the most important of these are discussed in this part.

Regarding political development in the twentieth century in different countries, the Pahlavi Regime of Iran had considered prospects for democracy and modernization from 1941 till 1951, that is, the first ten years of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign. In this decade, there occurred diversity in party systems, attention to peasant necessities, freedom of media and the establishment of a variety of newspapers. But in the rest of Mohammad Reza Shah's rule, Iran's political system shifted to a society with low level of participation and became an absolute monarchy. Definitely, limitations in the party system of Iran, which was on the path of modernization with its rich natural resources and traditional social system has been going to legitimacy and identity crisis in political development (Pye, 1966). Whatever, the Pahlavi regime had to get assistance of the international community especially America, for its land development reforms and liberalism but he had great domestic power which enabled the monarchy to control different parts of Iran's society and more importantly, control Parliament. In Huntington's viewpoint, the society must have a stable balance between participation and political institutions development; otherwise it would lead to instability in future (Huntington 1968).

To determine the conditions of political development problems and Iranian monarchy's vision of political development, this research discusses four cases related to the main issue of political development that were important in Iran Pahlavi regime: king's power tools including oil, army, bureaucracy, and royal ideology. This section looks at the Iranian monarchy of Pahlavi as not being committed and showing lack of attention to political development. It also looks at lack of better conditions of political growth over the world. While the democracy and development in aspects of developing countries had been dealt with; the Pahlavi Regime had its own perspective for implementation of political system progress at domestic level. This study discusses the major factors in political development to explain the Pahlavi Regime policy pertaining to political devel In all monarchies in the twentieth century, the centralization of power has played a significant role in most governments in Asia, Africa and Latin America. In Asia and especially in Iran during 1953-1979, there had been centralization of power to reach the absolute modern state. As far as Iran was concerned, it increased the royal power to exert control over parliament. Despite modernization of economic and social structures, the political structure had been underdeveloped during Mohammad Reza Shah's reign. He did not allow formation of pressure groups and suppressed the various social forces. He had said in his speech that, "I try to make this country a kind of modern state with absolute justice, not only in the court but having social justice". Moreover, he cut down the links between the monarch and the old classes as well as new classes and just maintained his power by certain tools which were: the army, security service of SAVAK, oil revenue, bureaucracy and court patronage (Binder 1962).

The Pahlavi Regime was very rich because of the huge revenue derived from oil exports. The central support of the Shah had been the militants and he fortified the armed forces, army weaponry, praetorian establishments and increased the annual military budget to the extent that they were ranked fifth, in terms of military strength, in the Middle East. Thus, there had been military personnel who engaged in politics to promote higher pay and distribution of power throughout the political system (Abrahamian 1982). As for the theme of change, M.R.P said, "You have to change, if not, you are going down and down and cannot move up because of lack of discipline. To change It needs dicipline and more work" (Pahlavi 1975).

In fact, as the king's legitimacy drained away he became more dependent on the military forces as an important tool. Consequently, to upgrade the standard and capability of the military, he had to reduce the budget for schools, roads, hospitals and other projects which were downsized to make possible military forces improvement. This is borne out by the statement: "In Iran, the resignation of the reform Prime Minister, Dr.Ali Amini, in July 1962 was apparently caused in part by his desire to cut back the size of the army from 200,000 to 150,000 men in order to acquire funds for Land Reform and other modernization purposes" (Huntington 1968).

In fact, no modernizing monarchy is immune after a military coup but Iran's king did manage to handle the situation for a while. It is obvious that political modernization is the result of military failure, and centralization of power is successful when the military has a hand in consolidating the government's power. In this research, the oil income is the second of the king's power tools. The plan of socio-economic development in Iran that stated in 1950 had not been heading in the right direction. S.Huntington opines that the economic development was a push towards democracy, particularly as it was the time of the second wave of democracy in the world, but, Huntington says, in many countries, economic development had been caused due to instability of the absolute monarchy and it pressured these regimes to make the country towards liberal state or increasing the suppression on the people (Huntington 1993). The researcher criticized the Shah, as Iran at his time was just on its modernizing path, so he was wrong to compare Iran with modernized countries such as U.S.A or Britain. M.R Pahlavi (1978) also criticized these countries as being unbalanced, and criticized the U.S.A for its democracy and elections (Pahlavi 1975).

This was happened in Iran after the 1953 coup. The Shah used the oil revenue to expand his army rather than use it for the people's welfare His answer to a reporter who had asked him, What is your ambition as the fourth largest military in the world? Was "probably the

best“ (Pahlavi 1975). As Abrahamian quoted, “The second source of wealth was the oil revenue. According to one reliable western economist, in the last few years of the regime substantial sums - perhaps as much as \$1 billion - were transferred directly from oil revenues into secret foreign bank accounts held by members of the royal family. These transfers left no trace in the state treasury, but caused statistic discrepancies between the sum oil companies paid to Iran and the sum the Iranian government received from the oil companies” (Abrahamian 1982).

Definitely, oil revenue impact was important in accomplishing reform plans and political and economic stability as well. In Iran, the modern state used control of the socio-political situation not to help democracy and political development. In this case, the Shah commented on democracy when replying to foreign journalists that, “Freedom of thought, or democracy with this five-years-old strikes! I do not want any part of them.“ Obviously, the absolute monarchy plan was geared towards the Shah having the power and control to spend income derived from natural resources in any which way he wanted. Huntington(1968) pointed out, the Prime Minister Amini in 1962 acted independently of the throne, when he disagreed to spend much money on military expansion, and this consequently led to his forced resignation (Huntington 1968, FitzGerald 1974).

The most prominent effort for control of oil was in the case of Mosaddiq when he attempted to nationalize oil. The oil revenue had been one of the most important instruments of absolute monarchy power in Iran. The restrictions and severe control of the media and political parties was an obvious sign of fear and was intended for the Shah to keep his grip on the throne. The Iranian regime of Pahlavi had implemented several repressive policies under many different programs in order to restrict and control the social and political opposition groups. The security service SAVAK that was under the control of General Nasiri played a crucial and decisive role in this matter. “SAVAK had the power to censor the media, screen applicants for government jobs and according to reliable western sources, use all means necessary, including torture, to hunt down dissidents” (Abrahamian 1982).

In one hand the Shah’s attempt for socio-economic development was notable but the restraint of opposition by SAVAK and raising tensions at political level hampered the process of development in Iran during 1953-1979. In the words of British journalist, SAVAK was the Shah’s “eyes and ears, and where necessary, his iron fist” (Graham 1979).

The interconnection between secular parties, conservative, and religious parties to each other against the Iran’s regime was detrimental to survival of the monarchy of Pahlavi. Efforts to combine tradition and modernization with a ruling monarchy had not successfully worked in Iran. The one-party regime of Iran, that in fact was a personal dictatorship, suppressed elites, competitive election or political participation and the main tool of control was a strong security service. Obviously, the regime systematically used torture, suppression and censorship to create fear in opposition groups through SAVAK. Inevitably, the political authority had to be legitimate as this increases its authority and the faith of people with regards to it. So, every nation draws up a constitution to legitimize the government. If this is not done, there is a good possibility of it moving towards revolution, as it had happened in Iran 1979 (Pye, 1966). Relationships among development levels had been more complicated during the second half of the twentieth century that created challenges between social, economic and political progress (Hunter and Malik 2005).Through limitations to progress at political level, the Shah had not shown any tendency for political development. Such socio-economic progress plans of the Shah needed the determinant key of success in this level in which Pahlavi Regime had this key by the tool of bureaucracy to expand his monarchy power. He increased the number of ministers from twelve to twenty and increased the number of provinces, district and villages; all these changes needed new officers and subordinates (Abrahamian 2008).

Harold Laski (1967) quoted “Bureaucracy is a system, the control of which is so completely in the hands of officials that their power jeopardizes the liberties of ordinary citizens.” Prof Lasky mentioned here a critical definition of bureaucracy whereby he considers the freedom

of citizens as being very important and valuable. He believed that bureaucracy robbed citizens of their freedom.

Apparently, the Pahlavi Regime, for reinforcing its absolute modern state expanded bureaucracy on the basis of Max Webber's definition of: "Bureaucracy is a system of administration characterized by expertness, impartiality and absence of humanity." As he said, there is an absence of sensibility. The modern bureaucracy in Iran such as during the pre-Pahlavi of patriarchal system bureaucracy had not had a suitable progressive development. In fact the formulation of city councils was considered but they had no real power for dismissal or appointment. In fact in Pahlavi's government, increasing control agencies were established, parallel with overlapping responsibilities. The regime had an independent legislature but in practice there was not any real interference in the executive (Bashiriye 2001).

Modernization needs bureaucracy, as S.Huntington (1965) had quoted "the appointment of modern men to the bureaucracy is, indeed, necessary for reform and is a crucial means by which the monarch reduces his dependences on the traditional elites in the bureaucracy." Researcher viewed, in Iran, with the people's traditional attitude, the process of modernization and reform got slowed down and the Shah got help from traditional elements to have their support in modernization. As this article looks for the closest point of reason of political underdevelopment in Iran, and findings are that the tools of king power is court patronage which had been reinforced as the richest resource for Iran's monarchy during 1953-1979. Abrahamian (1982) stated, "This pillar enabled the Shah to reward his followers with a vast array of lucrative salaries, pensions, and sinecures. The court revealed the true extent of his wealth, of course, but western estimates place the fortune accumulated by the royal family, both inside and outside Iran, at anywhere between five and twenty billion dollars" (Abrahamian 1982).

Consequently, the Royal Court, had its hands in agriculture, industries, entrepreneurs and any economic plan that had huge benefits for the royal family directly and for the Shah indirectly. As a consequence, the Pahlavis became the largest landlords in Iran and definitely placed the Shah in the peak of the Pahlavi family hierarchy in terms of having commercial farms. Anyway they held key sectors of the economy and this became one of biggest supports of Mohammad Reza Shah during his reign (Binder 1962).

The Iranian regime had believed that this power tools would be enough to reach its aim to be a major power state in the Middle-East, and even changing to a one of big power states in the world through increasing military forces and spending of oil money to enhance its standing in the international place. This helped justify that other political parties and opposition groups had no right to activity and they were opposed by the secret police, SAVAK. The Iranian regime severely blocked all activities against it and any policies which help opposing views, or promoted political awareness levels (Abrahamian 2008). Therefore such reaction by the regime in political situations is obviously considered as a big mistake by the regime towards Iran's people rights to have a free access to real rights for political development and exchange their various thoughts, ideas and beliefs as well.

4. Summary

The situation of political development and its factors in the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah was illustrated. In order to give a clear political development's major factors in Iran, first a history of political structure Pahlavi regime during 1953-1979 was presented and also the coup of 1953 was discussed thereafter. Based on political fluctuations of Iran, there have been many changes in government policy after the 1953 coup and its impact started with overruling Mosaddiq and beginning of absolute monarchy. This article evaluate the capabilities of political system of Iran related to political development. Also, another factor was the response of political elites of Iran in different Iran's political occasions.

This article came to the conclusion that the influencing factors of political development after 1953 because of many reasons could not bring about the political development aims for Iran.

They could create some changes in political level in different way. Regime opposition groups proposed their demands by protests led by elites. Also, analysing the political development and to clarify the political occasions in Iran of 1953-1979. This article explained important issues related to political development barriers in Iran. As explained in all these cases, the Pahlavi regime denied all of factors influencing on political development in which oppressed the opposition groups, eliminated parties and decreased political competition and participation that contributed towards creating barriers of political development in Iran.

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