

Real Language

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Abstract

Human beings make themselves with language in history. Language defines human beings making them subjects of their being and mode of being. In this sense language is essential and exclusive of humans. The problem with language consists in explaining the reality of language, something internal to speakers but manifesting itself as external to them.

Keywords: language, a language, degree of reality, modes of thinking, modes of being of things

1. Language and the Speaking Subject

The first problem arising when you study language or any particular aspect of language is the problem of the nature of the object you study, that is, the nature of *language*. The first verification one can make is that language is something existing in speakers and by speakers. In this sense language is *internal* to the human being who speaks. Moreover language in so far as it is presented in most western languages with the word ‘language’ or similar ones (Fr. *langage*, Sp. *lenguaje*, P. *linguagem*, It. *linguaggio*, Sp. *lengua*, Fr. *langue*, etc.) appears as something existing in itself, something out there, imposing itself on speakers. On the other hand speakers speak for others, that is, speech is directed to someone else who understands. In this sense language is *external* to the speaking subject. The problem with language then is that language is both internal and external to human beings. In order to know what language is it is necessary to analyze the function language performs both in the speaking subject and the listener and in the group of speakers who can speak and understand language in its narrower and broader sense.

2. Language as Something Internal to the Speaking Subject

2.1 *Language as a Means to Overcome the Circumstance the Human Subject Is in*

Since language is internal to human subjects language is created in the conscience of speakers. A human subject is to be defined as *the speaking subject* (Coseriu 1985). Human subjects create language in their conscience because of which language defines human beings.

Language thus is something exclusive and essential of humans. This fact reveals the nature of speaking subjects: they *create* language because they are *free to imagine and create*. Language in as much as it is created exists as a voluntary act of its creators. The faculty of imagining and creating is exclusive of the human subject who is in a particular circumstance having to do something in order to overcome it and survive (Ortega y Gasset, 1992b, 1992b). Language is nothing given to humans. It is something they must create since it constitutes *the only means for them to survive in the world*.

2.2 Language Is for Others

Since language is internal to speaking subjects for language to be given there must be two speakers at least. Language is *aimed at someone else*. Human subjects create speech for others. In this sense language is not merely language: language is both *language* and *a language*. This fact reveals the double condition of being of humans. Human subjects create language speaking to others. That is, human subjects have to make themselves *freely in collaboration with others*. Speaking subjects are *together-with-others* (*otherness*, Coseriu 1985). In order to survive human subjects need the mutual help of others. This help is established through language and by means of language. In this sense speakers are co-speakers recognizing themselves in others. Because of this human subjects and language are *social*.

2.3 Language Made in History

Since human subjects make themselves in participation with others they are *historical*, that is, they make themselves in history just from their birth. Because of this language is *historical* too, the manifestation of the historicity of its speakers. Language manifests itself as a series of historical objects, languages, made in participation of all speakers thus forming systems of contents, forms, units, rules, procedures, beliefs and attitudes put in common and constituting different *speech communities* (common > community).

2.4 Language Is Purposeful

Since human subjects must do something in the circumstance they are in language aims at achieving something pragmatic at the speaker's interest. Because of this the state of affairs denoted in the linguistic expression is different from the reality denoted. Language thus is *meaningful* and *symbolic*. The words put in common in a speech community represent *social conventions* (Ortega y Gasset, 2001) but beyond these social conventions words and expressions aim at something not conventional but something determined intentionally, contextually and particularly. Language thus has *meaning*, *designation* and *sense* (Coseriu 1992). Language reveals *the meaningful intentional purpose of the individual speaker* (Martínez del Castillo, 2004, 2015b).

2.5 The Internal Arrangement of Things

Since speakers are *creative* because they are *free* and thus *absolute* aiming at achieving something different they are *transcendent*. They do not describe things but create and represent the things created arranging and re-arranging them in their conscience. This means that speakers *define themselves* in the circumstance they are in, that is, they *say* about the things constituting the circumstance they are in (Martínez del Castillo, 2004). In this sense the execution of language, *speaking*, is not speaking but *speaking* and *understanding*. This

fact as well reveals the character of the speaking subject. The speaking subject is *intelligent* because he is able to re-arrange things in order to get the maximum profit of the situation surrounding him.

2.6 Internal Definition of the Speaking Subject

Since human subjects are free, creative, absolute, transcendent, together-with-others, social and historical, human subjects have a peculiar way of knowing. Speaking is not only speaking a language. It is *speaking, saying and knowing*. Human subjects speak because they have something to say, they say because they define themselves in the circumstance they are in at any moment and they define themselves because they are able to know (Martínez del Castillo, 2004, 2015b).

2.7 The Human Way of Knowing

Since language is speaking, saying and knowing, the deepest genesis of language is *the peculiar way of knowing of humans*. The human way of knowing consists in *the symbolic mental representation of different acts of perception* thus making them into *things*. As a mental representation the act of knowing consists of two basic mental operations: first, it consists of the *percept* come to us through our senses or through imagination and creation. It is *intuition (intuito, Descartes)* designated as *aísthesis* (αἴσθησις=sensation) by Aristotle (cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992). *Aísthesis* represents the starting point in human knowledge. Although it is sensitive it represents a mental understanding of itself, the connection of simple ideas representing something sensitive constituting with it a new reality (Ortega y Gasset, 1992). And second, it consists of *the symbolic mental representation* once the nature of *aísthesis* is changed in its way of being that from *sensitive and concrete* is made into *abstract*. The symbolic mental representation made in the conscience of the individual speaker is always executed in something *material* to be offered to others: *words* in the case of language and the particular means used in the different arts (a *surface* in painting, a piece of *marble* in sculpture, etc.). The human act of knowing represents the *synthesis* of *sensibility* and *intellect* by means of *imagination* (Kant, 2004), that is, the synthesis of the percept and something created on the part of the knowing subject.

Since the words used in the act of knowing are common, that is, social conventions not belonging to the subject but the speech community, one thing is the percept perceived, that is, lived and something different is the meaning of words and something different is the things said. This is the *problem of lógos* or the problem of the relationships between *language and thought*. *Lógos* is the state lived by the speaking subject in his conscience. As a state lived in his conscience *lógos prompts the act of knowing* and thus the mental representation of *aísthesis* come to us through the senses. *Lógos* is sensitive and concrete. Since the human subject is intelligent *lógos is intuitively understood* but not made explicit. The problem comes when human subjects try to express their *logos* in words that represent social conventions.

2.8 The Birth of Language

Since speaking subjects create language aiming at achieving something and since language is for others having to represent their creations mentally in words human subjects are *limited* and *contingent*. This means that language is limited, contingent and depends on the sounds of words, that is, language is *form*. Because of this language is born *at the moment of speaking*.

Language is *born when it is spoken*. Language thus is nothing given to speakers, nothing existing before speakers. Language is the activity of speaking made by speakers involving knowledge, the knowledge to speak.

2.9 Language and Form

The fact that language is form can be justified as well in the fact that for a human conscience to get into contact with another one is only possible through material means. Language thus is constituted with different systems of forms bearing contents forming units, rules and procedures and revealing attitudes and beliefs in force in a *speech community*.

2.10 The Speech Act as the Internal Activity of Speaking

The speech act as a matter of fact represents the internal activity performed by speakers. As internal activity the speech act can be decomposed in a set of internal *mental* or *intellective operations* having to do with the act of conceiving and tackling with the chunk of reality apprehended and made known, *the act of knowing*. The speaking subject *approximates* reality, tries to capture it apprehending it with his senses (*aisthesis*), *selects* something out of the original concrete and sensual apprehension of reality, *delimits* the object apprehended thus transforming it into an abstract mental construct, *creates a class or an essence*, *gives the construct a name*, *relates* it to other concepts either existing in the conscience of the speaker or in the language, *determines* it thus orientating the construct created into real things and *expresses* it in words of a language. In this process of apprehension of the real in the act of knowing the speaking subject makes the following mental operations: first, the sensual concrete and material apprehension of things, *intuition*, *aisthesis*; second, the *selection* of something out of the initial apprehension of things; third, the *delimitation* of the thing apprehended and selected; fourth, the *creation of a class or essence* (a category) to attribute it to the construct created so far; fifth, *relating* the construct created to other concepts created either in the background of the speaker or in the tradition of speaking; sixth, *giving the construct created a name*; seventh, *determining* or orientating the construct created so far to the real; and finally *expressing* it in words of a language. In this process the construct apprehended was changed in its way of being in different forms: the *sensual and concrete* was made into *abstract*; the abstract was made *virtual* with the addition of the ideas of necessity and universality; the virtual was made *objective*; then the construct created was orientated to real things thus making it *real*; and finally with the use of words to express it the construct is made *linguistic*. The speech act is nothing but the execution of an act of knowing thus revealing the existence of language as something internal to speaking subjects (Martínez del Castillo, 2004, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d).

As a consequence the speech act conceived in this way is nothing but the internal activity made by the speaking subject thus making possible the existence of what we call language and things such as they are conceived and considered to exist. Language thus is activity, *the activity of speaking* (Coseriu 1992), performed internally in accordance with the peculiar way of knowing of humans. Human knowledge encompasses both the sensitive given in intuition and the mental thus forming the symbolic representation in the synthesis of both (cf. Ortega y Gasset, 1992a; Ortega y Gasset, 1992b).

2.11 Language as the Result of the Human Act of Knowing

The object to be studied now, language, is thus the product of *sensibility* (experience) and *intellect* (reason) by means of *imagination* and historicity. In this sense language as an object of knowledge is not anything different from any other object known. The human knowing subject who studies language as an object *separates himself* from the reality known. The reality of language is something lived in the conscience of the subject studying it different from the image or mental representation he as a speaker must create in his conscience in order to study it. However the reality of language manifests itself externally (cf. § 3 below). The external manifestation of language constitutes the data the linguist, both a linguist and a speaker, must analyze in order to verify his theory and interpret language.

2.12 Language and the Mental Problem Created in the Act of Knowing

Language is the way it is because human subjects created it in their conscience thus revealing the human way of being, behaving and knowing. Correspondingly the words used to refer to the reality of language such as *language, a language, speech, speech acts* and the many of them referring to aspects of the reality of language used in the study of it (*linguistic competence, sentence, word, text, thought* etc.) do not refer to particular autonomous realities. They do not exist as concrete realities. Because of this they cannot be taken as the starting point to study the problem of language. They are nothing but particular aspects of a higher reality, *the reality of humans* who speak because they have something to say, who say because they define themselves before the circumstance they are in, who define themselves because they know thus constituting the only means they have to survive in the circumstance they are in. Language thus cannot be understood unless in connection to humans and the human life. Language does not constitute an autonomous unique reality but it refers to particular aspects of the reality of speaking subjects.

3. Language as Something External to Speakers

Since language is form language manifests itself as something external to the speaking subject. Language thus constitutes a system to speak coming from the outside of the speaking subject, from others. Since all speakers participate in speaking language is constituted as a *technique of speaking put in common*. Because of this (the *commonness* of language) language constitutes the base of society in what it is called a *speech community*. The base of society is to be found in the peculiar way of being of humans, they are, as has already been said, together-with-others, that is, they participate with others in the same level of historicity and recognize themselves in others recognizing in the You another I (Coseriu 2006, 44). Although the reality of language is primarily internal *language manifests itself in others* because it is participated with others.

3.1 Historicity and the Process of Language Learning

Human speaking subjects are born in a particular speech community at a particular moment of history. Because of this when they are born they will learn language *intuitively* in particular *historical conditions*. The language in force in a particular speech community constitutes a *system of designations* offered to speakers (Coseriu 1985). Speakers will *accept* the great majority of historical forms in force in the particular speech community they are born in and will *create* and thus *offer* new ones to the others. The newly born speaking subject will try to reproduce the sounds he hears and will interpret them in terms of meanings and designation.

The forms and meanings *created* by him will coincide with the ones in force in his speech community or not. If the new form created is accepted he will reaffirm in his creation but if he verifies that the form is not accepted he will reject it. This process of language learning will last all the speaker's life long. It is the *process of creation and resignation*: creation of new individual forms and resignation of forms created tentatively if not accepted (Cosieru 1992). The process of language learning is based on the peculiar way of being of humans. Human subjects participate with others because they recognize themselves in others (*otherness*). Language is born when the words created by the individual speaker reverberate in the listener, that is, when the subjective representation of the sound given back to the ear of the listener is translated into something objectively real without being deprived of its original subjectivity (Humboldt, 1990). The condition of this process of participation and recognition is historicity.

3.2 Language as it Manifests Itself in Diálogos

The degree of reality (cf. Ortega y Gasset 2005) of language cannot be verified in itself but in its manifestation. Language as internal to the speaking subject constitutes something previously known because of intuition in an internal experience. Speakers can verify their knowledge to speak (*idiomatic knowledge*, Cosieru 1992) in the verbal behavior of others. In dialogue (*διά-λογος*=by means of *lógos*) language manifests as it is. Language is speaking and understanding for both the speaker and the listener relieving each other in their roles of speaker and listener (Ortega y Gasset 1987).

3.2.1. Language and Lógos

Language manifests itself as *language*, that is, as the state lived by the speaker in his conscience. In this sense language is *lógos*, *the creation of meanings* in the conscience of the speaking subject. But *lógos* when it manifests itself needs the words of a language. Since words are social conventions *lógos* appears only as the meanings of a language: *lógos* as the reality lived by speakers in their conscience constitutes something different from meanings. The problem with *lógos* consists in guessing what it is. This problem is always present in dialogue. Speakers do not pay attention to the words used but to the speaker's intention.

Cosieru separates two types of *lógos*: *semantic lógos* and *apophantic lógos*. Semantic *lógos* as a state lived by the speaking subject is universal since it constitutes the meaningful function. It is historical since it belongs to a particular language performed in historical forms. And it is individual since the meaningful function is expressed in forms of a language using contexts and situations.

Lógos when it appears with a poetic, pragmatic or fantastic determination is *apophantic lógos*. Apophantic *lógos* is universal in three senses: a) in as much as it is knowledge (example: *it is minus twelve degrees outside*); b) differs from logic (example: *he lived to be three scores and five*); and c) linguistic classifications of the real (=linguistic categories) differ from scientific classifications (example: *it is evening, it is dawn*). In this sense *lógos* apophantic goes beyond languages. It is historical since the real and its knowledge impose on linguistic intuition and meanings (example: *a sea of troubles*). And it is individual since it appears in particular types of texts (a sonnet, a song, a ballad, greetings, etc.) (cf. Martínez del Castillo, 2009).

3.2.2 Language as a Language

Language manifests itself as a particular or historical *language*, that is, *a historical object* made in history in force and supported on a particular *speech community*. As a historical object a language manifests itself as independent and different from others.

3.2.3 Language as Speech

But languages cannot be verified in themselves but in *speech*. In order to verify a particular language it is necessary to know about that language somehow. In accordance with the peculiar way of knowing of humans, for a human free subject to know he has to add something mental previously known or created on intuition to the thing perceived at the very act of knowing. As with language and a language *speech* is known because of an interior experience, that is, on intuition. Because of this idiomatic knowledge is previous to the performance of speech.

Speech can be verified in innumerable *speech acts*. From the point of view of the creation of concepts, the concept “speech act” involves an apparent contradiction. It represents a typical *synthetic a priori statement*: an assumption taken from the real (experience) and given universality and necessity (Kant, Descartes, Ortega y Gasset). For a *synthetic a priori* statement to be given it is necessary to verify the existence of a few items of the thing studied in experience. Then the mental image of those few items is taken as representative of the whole class of items thus making it be considered the *essence* of what is going to be studied. But since a speech act is known intuitively because the knowledge of it is previous to its performance it cannot be considered a synthetic a priori statement. This fact reveals the difficulty involved in the study of language and the human problems they all involved with freedom and free activities.

On the other hand speech acts which are innumerable having been given in the past, being given in the present and constituting the mental image for future performances revert to *the activity of speaking*, something made by *speakers*, the product of a free intelligent agent (*the human speaking subject*) thus giving *an object made* (speech acts, speech) and revealing the reality of language and a language.

3.3 Problems Posed in the Study of Language and the Human Sciences

The fact of the existence of language on the one hand and the different and disparate languages on the other poses the problem of which one is first. This problem, which is the same as the one distinguishing language as internal and external to the speaking subject, can be solved in two ways: a) the concept of language may be achieved with abstracting from the different languages in the world, that is, from experience through *induction*. In this sense languages are first and language would be the generalization of the peculiarities of particular languages once they were studied and analyzed. This is the assumption of the so-called *general linguistics*, sometimes called *typology*. Or the contrary, b) the concept of language may be the result of an original intuitive idea by speakers. In this sense language as the creation of meanings and *lógos* is first. This position is to be justified in the fact that language is internal to the speaking subject thus constituting internal knowledge previous to the act of speaking and thus knowing. The problem in this second position consists in explaining and interpreting the previous knowledge they have about human problems in terms of the reality of humans with the constant verification of them in the verbal behavior of speakers.

Human subjects create things in the very act of knowing. Dealing with human matters—and linguistics in particular—the so-called *original (intuitive) knowledge* determines theories. Original knowledge is that type of knowledge a man has about him himself and his free activities (and of course, about the aims and purposes of these ones) (Husserl; cf. Coseriu 1986b). Aristotle solved this problem with the introduction of *purposeful causes* in the study of things, causes determining free acts. J. B. Vico introduced the distinction between *certum* and *verum* in science. In human sciences, for Vico, *certum* and *verum* coincide (Coseriu 1986b: 70). In human sciences theories are present before, during and after empirical verification. Before, in as much as theories represent a preliminary delimitation of the original knowledge and the motivation of empirical verification; during, as the foundation and settings of that empirical verification; and after, as theories made clear, corrected and enriched with empirical verification. In accordance with this linguistics consists in the transformation of that original knowledge, *cognitio clara confusa* into *cognitio clara distincta et adaequata* (Leibniz) or the transformation of that type of knowledge only *known (bekannt)* into *recognized (erkannt)* (Hegel) (cf. Coseriu 1999).

Induction, that is, the study of things based on the individual cannot give us an idea of such a complex and multiform reality as the one in languages because in induction the thing to be studied is the individual one. The essence of things is a *mental creation* and because of this it must be *universal*. The mental creation created on a particular language or a set of particular languages will always be individual. In the case of language, something internal to speakers, the essence of language is known not because of induction or synthetic a priori statements but through intuition because of an *internal experience (original intuitive knowledge)*. Considering that language is something internal to the speaking subject and that language cannot be verified in itself unless in its performance language is first. Languages thus constitute *necessary conditions* for language to exist. Languages then constitute universals of language because they are necessary for the existence, performance and manifestation of language.

3.4 Language as it is Performed, the Activity of Speaking and Idiomatic Knowledge

The set of innumerable speech acts constitutes *the activity of speaking*. The activity of speaking in its deepest genesis is internal to speakers but manifests itself externally. The activity of speaking constitutes the data necessary for the study and verification of the reality of language. The activity of speaking manifests itself as knowledge, the knowledge to speak, *idiomatic knowledge* or *linguistic competence*. Idiomatic knowledge is formed on a double basis: on the base of individual creations and the solidarity of speaking subjects with their co-speakers. In this sense and through abstraction we can speak of different realities in the activity of speaking they all referring to the manifestation of language. If we consider the activity of speaking on the base of individual creations the activity of speaking involves two factors, *the agent of the activity*, the human subject, and *the thing done*. Due to the peculiarities of the human condition of being together-with-others and the fact that language is at least for two the thing done relates to *a language* and a language is necessarily supported by a *speech community*. Languages in this sense do not appear or disappear *they change and develop* because they are spoken. Because of this the concepts of a language and a speech community relate to the same reality, the first one stressing the thing done in itself and the

second one as the necessary condition for a language to exist.

In the study of language two axes must be established, the axis of *creation* and the axis of *solidarity*. Creation has to do with *innovation, variety* and *evolution*. Solidarity has to do with the actual *performance, fixation, permanence* and *homogeneity*. Since speakers are free and absolute they create and since speakers are together-with-others they keep a double relationship of solidarity with their co-speakers: solidarity with those who speak the same language at the moment of speaking, *horizontal solidarity*; and solidarity with those who spoke the language before them, *vertical solidarity*. The first type of solidarity is *synchrony* having to do with *the state of the language*. The second one has to do with *diachrony*, the study of the evolution of language in history.

3.5 The State of the Language

A state of the language is the language actually spoken in a particular speech community, a set of *systems of isoglosses* (=common speech acts) extending during a shorter or longer period of time. The state of the language involves a particular configuration of the activity of speaking. As a matter of fact a state of the language is nothing but *a traditional technique* in the activity of speaking functioning in a speech community. A technique of speaking is a set of knowledge, forms, contents and procedures by virtue of which the activity of speaking is performed. In synchrony all linguistic forms are *analogous*, not homogeneous. A language has constituted itself historically in a speech community as an ideal unit to be identified by its speakers. A language occurs historically and can be studied, not described, in its historical evolution. From the point of view of diachrony a language is *a series of techniques* in the activity of speaking (Coseriu 1986b) succeeding one another in history. The unity of the object we call a language, say English, is the set of common linguistic acts, that is, forms, contents and units constituting a *set of isoglosses*. Speakers of a particular language can identify this fact. They can understand the language of previous states of the language within certain limits. For example, English speakers can understand the language of Shakespeare because Modern English is constituted on the same tradition as the language of Shakespeare. The description of a language is to be made in terms of horizontal solidarity of its elements with one another; the evolution of the language is to be constituted in terms of the vertical solidarity of its elements.

4. Language as Something Autonomous

Since language necessarily manifests itself as a historical object it appears as something objective and autonomous. This fact reveals the way of knowing of humans who objectify things known. Every historical object (a language) reveals a cosmic vision of the world. A cosmic vision of a particular language or set of languages constituting groups is structured in two basic radical components: the *mode of thinking* of its speakers and the *mode of being of things*. Both components constitute the same factor in the problem of knowledge since the mode of being is nothing but the mode of thinking as it is performed in things. The mode of thinking is notional, the mode of being executive (Martínez del Castillo, 2013, 2015j).

In the Western World the prevailing mode of thinking is the so-called *substantive being* born around the Eastern Mediterranean in the sixth century before Christ. For Parmenides of Elea, being, what it is, what is behind what it is, is alien to generation and corruption. Being is,

according to Parmenides, one, eternal, immovable, with no principle or end. Together with this he added, being is and it is impossible for it not to be and non-being is not (Ferrater Mora). In accordance with the analysis of Ortega y Gasset Parmenides extracted being from non-being (=nought). For Ortega y Gasset, this conception meant the attribution of reason to the real. Because of this thought became *lógos*, that is, something going beyond words (Ortega y Gasset OC, IX: 1063).

This conception of being created innumerable metaphysical problems, one of them the problem of movement. In the fourth century before Christ Aristotle formulated the concept of being as *ἐνέργεια ὄν*. Being is a substance, something existing in itself. With this he distinguished three aspects in being: being is being in act, *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἔργον*, not needing anything else to exist; being is the performance of itself, *ἐνέργεια κατ' ἐνέργειαν*; and being is the mental image of itself, *ἐνέργεια κατα δύναμιν*. For example, a block of marble is a piece of rock but it may become a statue of Jove thus constituting the image of Jove and Jove itself. With the introduction of the concept of substance to the concept of being by Aristotle, *ἐνέργεια ὄν*, things can be analyzed individually, generally and universally. For example, *I saw a squirrel; a male squirrel; a squirrel is a small furry wild animal with a long bushy tail*, respectively.

The so-called substantive being conceives things objectively as if they were things in themselves. It is the peculiar and underlying mode of thinking in force in western languages, the Western World and the Western Civilization, contrary to other civilizations all around the world conceiving things differently. As a matter of fact Greek thinkers took this concept of being from their tradition of speaking and their cultural influence made other people adopt this way of thinking.

The concept of substantive being was later on modified in the 17th century with the introduction of *intuition* in thinking by Descartes, the modern mode of being or *being as intuition*. This fact prompted the birth of idealism in philosophy and the creation of positive science (the *new science*) by Galileo. Today since 20th century new modes of being were introduced, namely, *being as it manifests itself*, *executive being* and *real being*, modes of being co-existing with substantive being and being as intuition. These modes of being can be seen in language in the following way:

- a) Speakers intuit and create language (the mode of thinking of being as intuition).
- b) Speakers acquire and perform language (executive mode of thinking).
- c) For speakers, language is *διάλογος*: activity and mode of speaking, that is, speakers speak, say and know in accordance with historical traditions thus involving others (mode of thinking of being as manifesting itself).
- d) Speakers use language thus making themselves human (mode of thinking of being as real).
- e) Speakers evaluate and speak of language as a series of entities: language, the English language, meanings, words, speech, speech act, speech sounds, the correct use of expressions and words, etc. (substantive mode of thinking).

And this is the basis for us to say that speakers live language, that is, *speakers intuit, create, acquire, perform, speak and say, use, evaluate* and even *speak of language*. This fact can be

analyzed in linguists when they study language. Since linguists are necessarily speakers of a language they must use language, the same as ordinary speakers, to make a description of language, that is, to determine the degree of reality of the problem of language. For speakers language

- 1) Involves intuition to know the piece of reality they want to speak of. For linguists language study involves the creation of a theory. That is, the linguist has to make series of *analytic statements* (modern mode of thinking).
- 2) Speakers learn language from their co-speakers. For linguists to study language means describing *the verbal behavior of speakers* either individually or in participation with others in a speech community (executive mode of thinking).
- 3) Speakers manifest their intelligence and freedom, their mode of thinking and way of conceiving things in speech. For linguists language must be described in accordance with the way of being of speakers (mode of thinking of being as manifesting itself)
- 4) Since speakers use the circumstance they are in thus creating contexts to define themselves and speak linguists must study the degree of reality of language and all aspects in it in terms of the radical reality they are based on, that is, the human subject (being as real).
- 5) And for both speakers and linguists the description of language and its manifestations cannot be made unless language manifestations are objectified, that is, conceived as entities (substantive being).

5. Language and Speakers

Language exists in speakers, because of speakers and for speakers. Language is both internal and external to the speaking subject, something intuited since it constitutes knowledge created in the conscience of the individual speaker, performed in accordance with thought just because it is *lógos*; aimed at achieving something different, put in common in a speech community thus making and re-making itself in history; something material used as a means of expression, directed to someone else, participated by all speakers who recognize themselves in others thus constituting the essence of human subjects and the only means they have to survive in this world.

6. Conclusion

Language is real in as much as it relates to human subjects who are free and contingent, absolute and limited, transcendent and historical thus making themselves in participation with others and recognizing themselves in others. Human subjects speak, say and know. Since language depends on human subjects linguistics is nothing but the study of real language manifest in the verbal behavior of speakers.

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