The Role of Investment Banking in M&A Operations: Empiric Pre and Post Lehman Evidence

Abstract

The role of investment banks in M&A operations is analyzed on the basis of empiric evidence. In particular, to point out the variations in the impact of the certification effect which can be ascribed to investment banks, the relationship between the value created for the shareholders in companies involved in special underwriting operations and the reputation of the banks appointed to act as advisors is examined. The analysis, which uses an original measuring system in order to assess and classify the reputation variable, focuses on transactions that have taken place between listed companies in two time frames, symmetrical to each other, specifically pre and post the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy. The total sample is composed of 229 transactions, divided into 161 and 68 observations, respectively pre and post Lehman. The result is that in the post Lehman period, unlike the preceding time frame, for which no significant empiric evidence is found, the wealth of the shareholders (of both targets and acquirers) is significantly influenced by the reputation of the investment banks which have acted as advisors. This indicates that, subsequent to the shock of the Lehman Brothers collapse, the certifying effect of the investment banks takes on an important role in the shareholders' choice.