

General Border Committee Malaysia-Indonesia (GBC Malindo) from the Perspective of Comprehensive Border Security Cooperation Model (CBSC Model)

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Received: March 28, 2024 Accepted: May 10, 2024 Published: June 17, 2024

doi:10.5296/ijssr.v12i2.21995 URL: <https://doi.org/10.5296/ijssr.v12i2.21995>

Abstract

Although GBC Malindo is still standing firm since its establishment in 1972 as a security cooperation framework in the management of the Malaysia-Indonesia land border, there are still scholars who question its effectiveness. This doubt is due to the series of security issues at the land border of Malaysia and Indonesia that are still occurred. The fact is, GBC Malindo has successfully addressed various issues in border security management. However, it cannot be denied that there are indeed issues and challenges faced from the unavoidable factors. Therefore, in order to verify the effectiveness of GBC Malindo, the analysis will be carried out through the perspective of the Comprehensive Border Security Corporation Model (CBSC Model), based on the evaluation of the six (6) components in the CBSC Model. This model was developed by the researchers based on the writings of four (4) scholars namely Stephen B. Jones (1945), Martin Pratt (2010), Leigh Barrick (2015) and Paul Fawcett et al. (2018) who highlighted the Boundary Making Theory, where this theory has become the basis for the formation of CBSC Model. The analysis results found that all the factors that have affected security cooperation in GBC Malindo have only been successfully addressed

with comprehensive border security cooperation through the creation of a legal framework, the establishment of border institutions, government commitment through committed efforts and support, also prospering the border through the exploration of new cooperation, the implementation of economic and social development as well as dealing with security issues through border security cooperation, except in the aspect of security governance where there are still various issues that cannot be resolved and need attention by the government, especially GBC Malindo leaders and secretariat, along with in integrating the community where the level of community involvement in activities planned by Sosek Malindo is still low.

Keywords: GBC Malindo, security cooperation framework, Malaysia-Indonesia land border, factors affecting the effectiveness of GBC Malindo, analysis of the GBC Malindo effectiveness through the CBSC Model, 6 components in the CBSC Model, Boundary Making Theory

1. Introduction

GBC Malindo is a border security cooperation platform between Malaysia and Indonesia that was created through the Security Arrangement (SA) Regulations 1972 and updated in 1984 with the objective of improving the border security of both countries. GBC Malindo is jointly chaired by the Minister of Defense Malaysia and Indonesia, as well as members appointed by their respective Governments. Under GBC Malindo, there is a High-Level Committee (HLC) jointly chaired by the Commander of the Malaysian Armed Forces and the Commander of the Indonesian National Army and other members appointed by the respective Co-Chairmen of GBC Malindo. The direction in GBC Malindo is carried out by four working committees covering operational aspects involving border control and enforcement, while non-operational involving the management of entry points and aspects of social and economic development of the demarcation (Note 1).

Throughout its establishment over 50 years ago, various approaches and strategies as well as programs and activities that have been implemented through working committees formed based on designated functions. However, the approach and strategy taken has still not shown a significant impact in dealing with the issues of security threats at the border of the two countries and subsequently has a significant impact on national security. The security level of the Malaysia-Indonesia land border is still low and debatable, especially the border is still said to be porous and border security issues are still frequent, especially involving cross-border crimes such as smuggling of illegal immigrant, subsidized goods, drugs, and firearms. This situation is very worrying because the government has placed GBC Malindo as the main cooperation framework in the management of national border security through the National Security Policy (NSP) 2021–2025.

Apart from that, there is a gap of different opinions among the scholars who study about the effectiveness of GBC Malindo. Among them, weaknesses in terms of the implementation of programs and activities that have been delayed and cannot be implemented (Iva Rachmawati & Fauzan, 2012), lack of commitment from the government and governance weaknesses on Indonesia side (Mutia Asmarani et al., 2013) as well as weaknesses in coordination between agencies and state (Words of Fahrozi, 2019). At the same time, GBC Malindo security cooperation has been successful in improving security, particularly involving joint control operations, the construction of joint posts and socio-economic development at the border (Ruhanas, 2009) as well as civil-military cooperation in GBC Malindo has successfully dealt with illegal activities in Malaysia-Indonesia border (Mohamad Wieldan Akbar et al., 2019).

Based on this situation, it clearly shows that there is a gap on the effectiveness of the GBC Malindo in improving the security of the Malaysia-Indonesian land border, based on the different views or perceptions of previous scholars on the effectiveness of the GBC Malindo. This situation may be due to the studies carried out previously not being comprehensive and focusing on a certain aspect only. Therefore, it is very important for a comprehensive study to be carried out to measure the effectiveness of GBC Malindo as a main framework by considering all aspects of the security management of the Malaysia-Indonesia land border.

2. Research Methodology

This study was carried out qualitatively where primary data was obtained through interviews with seven respondents involved with GBC Malindo as well as document analysis from brochures and minutes of GBC Malindo meetings. In addition, to analyze the effectiveness of GBC Malindo security cooperation, the analysis will be made through the perspective of the Comprehensive Border Security Corporation Model (CBSC Model). This model has been developed by the authors based on the writings of four scholars namely Stephen B. Jones (1945), Martin Pratt (2010), Leigh Barrick (2015) and Paul Fawcett et al. (2018) which highlights the Boundary Making Theory, where this theory has become the basis for the formation of this CBSC Model.

2.1 Evolution in Boundary Making Theory

The Boundary-Making Theory was first introduced by Stephen B. Jones (1945) who highlighted the importance of forming a border in which the government needs to provide territorial allocations to deal with border conflicts, legislate through agreements to determine the border line, place the border line as a sign and determine the administrative line that controls the border. Jones's idea was to prepare a border to face the Second World War following the outbreak of the First World War. All these requirements have been implemented through the GBC Malindo framework. The authors see that Jones who is the pioneer of this theory has highlighted the Government as an actor at the border that acts in managing the border where he also identified the components of security governance and the mechanism of the legal framework as an important matter to be considered in the formation of the border.

However, Martin Pratt (2010) has redeveloped this theory by Jones by stating that in addition to the governance component in border formation, security issues that occur at the border also need to be considered, especially after the border line is finalized. According to Pratt, it is a string of too many diplomats and lawyers who consider the border will be finished as soon as it is finalized but the fact is that it is only a beginning, and the most important thing is what will be done at the border after it is set to determine whether it is successful or not. Pratt is also of the view that border management is a complex task and an increasing challenge where the Government must balance non-uniform goals, maximizing access for goods, people, and views while at the same time maintaining national security but also ensuring that it is agreed upon by all parties involved.

Then Leigh Barrick (2015) developed Jones's theory by highlighting that the border community is an actor at the border, in addition to the Government highlighted by Jones and developed by Pratt, where the border community also needs to be given attention because it can create conflicts and threats at the border that are risky to the boundary formation. Barrick also developed other components that need to be emphasized in the formation of borders, which are related to society (societal) and cross-border crime. In addition, the component highlighted by Barrick is also the same as Jones and Pratt, which is through the strengthening of security governance.

Meanwhile, Paul Fawcett et al. (2018) highlighted that Boundary-Making is related to the

governance framework operated by policy makers where there is still ambiguity in boundary management due to governance issues triggered by officials in related agencies and within the institutional framework itself. In addition, it is also due to political competition for power. Fawcett et al. also stated that it is important in the formation of borders for the Government to focus on governance issues (local, regional, national, and global) through the establishment of specialized institutions or organizations in managing borders to avoid governance issues involving weak coordination between agencies and the ‘working in silo’ sentiment.

2.2 CBSC Model Development

By using Boundary Making Theory (TBM) as the basis of model formation, this study has explored the writings by the four scholars above in developing a comprehensive border security cooperation model. Although there are many other scholars who study border security in the context of TBM, but they are from different perspectives. There are also scholars who study TBM in the context of maritime borders and some who study TBM in a technical perspective (delimitation and demarcation). Therefore, in the context of this study, the authors will only focus on the arguments and views of these four scholars as shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Comparison of Studies by Scholars About TBM

Jones (1945)	Pratt (2010)	Barrick (2015)	Fawcett (2018)
Allocation	Maintenance	Community interference	Politic bureaucracy
Delimitation	Integration	Political ethnic	Lack of border policy and
Demarcation	Border prosperity	Transnational Crime	governance
Administration			Institutionalize border.
Actor	Actor	Actor	Actor
State	State	State	State
		Community	Politician
		Politician	

Source: Prepared by the Authors.

Table 1 above shows a comparison of studies by four (4) scholars that are felt to be very significant to the formation of this CBSC model. The model developed by previous scholars such as Jones, although it exists, only considers some components and actors and is not comprehensive. Due to that, the authors developed a model that considers all components and actors. However, authors focus of this model are on security cooperation, where cooperation is an aspect that determines the formation of effective and comprehensive boundaries. As a result of this comparison, the authors have identified the main requirements to form a comprehensive border security cooperation framework as shown in Figure 1 below. In summary, there are two main elements in this CBSC model, the first is the components of border security cooperation and the second is the actors’ functions and roles within the cooperation framework.




Figure 1. Diagram of the Comprehensive Border Security Cooperation Model (CBSC Model)

Source: Developed by the Author's.

The results of the measurement determined by the author are through three forms of assessment, namely achieving the CBSC level (if successful in fulfilling/solving all six components set), achieving partial CBSC (if only successfully fulfilling/solving a few components) and not reaching the CBSC level (if none of the components are successfully fulfilled/solved). Therefore, as a processor/pioneer to this CBSC Model, the authors will first analyse it to measure the effectiveness of security cooperation through the GBC Malindo framework between Malaysia and Indonesia, in managing and controlling the Malaysia-Indonesia land border.

In summary, the authors outline six (6) main components that is important in the border security cooperation, namely legal framework, border institution, government commitment (political will), security governance, societal integration, and border prosperity. Whereas the main actors involved in all these components are the state/government, politicians, and border communities.

2.3 CBSC Model Analysis Framework

By using the level of analysis, each component will be evaluated through three levels, namely country, institution, and community. According to Carmen Gebhard (2022), the level of analysis allows the understanding of a context and issue to be analysed better, especially involving actors at each level. Therefore, the analysis framework of the CBSC model is as shown in Figure 2 below.




Figure 2. Analysis Framework of the CBSC Model

Source: Author's designed.

At the state level, the analysis involves two components that are assessed, namely the legal framework and the government's commitment. Among the aspects or factors that can influence these two components are the country interests, the political bureaucracy influence, and the issue of trust (trust deficit) that underlies the formation of the legal framework and the government's commitment to security cooperation. At the institutional level, it involves two components, namely border institutions and security governance. There are many factors that can affect these two components, among them are the issue of coordination and cooperation between agencies, the structure and function of border institutions formed and the gap in state capacity and capability. While at the community level, it involves two components, namely community integration and border prosperity. Among the factors that can influence this component is the involvement of non-state actors such as communities, NGOs, private parties in improving border security and comprehensive economic benefits for the community at the border, as well as the country (economic liberalization, infrastructure network and communication).

This CBSC model will be applied by placing it as an evaluation benchmark for GBC Malindo security cooperation in whether the six (6) components have been successfully handled and addressed. In addition, the application of this model in GBC Malindo can also help in evaluating the factors that constrain the cooperation stability and strength that has been forged. By ensuring strong and stable security cooperation, it can indirectly lead to the integrity of the border formation for a country.

3. Analysis of the GBC Malindo Effectiveness Through the CBSC Model

3.1 Legislature

The legal framework is an important component in a cooperation framework that not only provides the basis of a cooperation establishment but also details several things about

membership, functions, and responsibilities, as well as commitments from both countries. Basically, land border security cooperation between Malaysia and Indonesia through GBC Malindo has had a legal framework since its inception. The establishment of GBC Malindo originated from the Security Arrangement (SA) 1972 which was signed on April 6, 1972, and updated on December 3, 1984 (SA 1984). SA1972 and SA1984 outline the requirements for the establishment of GBC Malindo (Note 2).

Revealing the history of the GBC Malindo establishment in 1972, it stems from several crises and military conflicts that occurred between the two countries, especially after the establishment of Malaysia (1963), confrontation (1964–1966) and insurgency (late 60s and 70s). The importance of cooperation especially involving the military of the two countries continues through GBC Malindo even though the focus and objective is more on improving border security. Currently, most defense cooperation has also been implemented through the GBC Malindo framework under the security regulations in the Malaysia-Indonesia border area (security agreement).

When Hishamuddin Hussein held the position as the Minister of Defense Malaysia and Chairman of GBC Malindo, he used GBC Malindo to expand defense cooperation through a defense memorandum of understanding (MOU) beyond border areas as well as MoU cooperation in the field of transnational crime for operations to deal with crime, increased cooperation between the two armed forces, administrative issues such as intelligence, logistics, operations, training, education, and proposed changes to the organizational structure of GBC Malindo. Under the Malindo GBC, there were agreements agreed in the field of education (1972), economic (1973), also youth and sports (1973) (C. Richard Bath, 1988).

During the 42nd GBC Malindo meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in 2022, an MoU was signed by the Chairman of the two countries to strengthen military cooperation in the field of defense science and technology and the defense industry involving the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF) and the Indonesian National Army (Note 3).

In the meantime, the legal framework at the domestic level also plays a role in supporting the establishment and implementation of GBC Malindo functions. For example, NSC which is the secretariat to GBC Malindo on the Malaysian side has issued NSC Directive No. 4 (Management of National Land Border Security) on August 2, 2017, which was signed by the Prime Minister, regarding the policies and mechanisms of overall land border security management, both within the country unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally with foreign countries. This directive has outlined the management of border security and development plans implemented through the GBC and HLC as well as the committees under it namely COCC, JKLB, JPCC and SOSEK Malindo (Note 4).

In addition, NSC also issued the NSP 2021–2025 on July 7, 2021, which has placed GBC Malindo as the main cooperation framework in the management of national border security. NSP 2021–2025 also underlines that the country could not ignore the security aspect at the border because it can cause other issues such as smuggling and invasion, also will affect the economy indirectly. In the NSP Security Landscape 2021–2025, cooperation with neighboring countries is also placed as the focus in Malaysian policy and the GBC Malindo

mechanism remains a platform for security cooperation on the Malaysia-Indonesia border (Note 5). Then, the Security and Public Order Policy 2019 issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) on October 3, 2019, has also placed border security management as a very important matter (Note 6).

3.2 Border Institution

GBC Malindo is an institution comprises of related agencies of both countries through the structure and function of the committee under it. In terms of structure, it is divided into two levels, namely the highest-level committee (GBC and HLC) and the working level committee (COCC, JKLB, JPCC and SOSEK). Each committee has a specific jurisdiction based on the function set by the highest-level committee through a specific directive.

Usually, the direction of GBC Malindo involves two segments which are operations and non-operations. In the operational segment, the directorate involves a routine agenda regarding border control and enforcement activities such as the coordination of Joint Operations, the creation of a Joint Post, intelligence information sharing, the implementation of capacity building between armed forces of these two countries, the implementation of Joint Training and Excise, knowledge sharing through exchange officers and members as well as coordination of Search and Rescue (SAR) activities, prevention of Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) involving drugs, firearms, printing and distribution of counterfeit money, pirate activities, human smuggling and illegal migrant.

While in the non-operational segment, it involves directing programs and activities related to socio-economic development in border areas including issues related to social, cultural, economic, cross-border trade, tourism, health, and infrastructure relations. In the meantime, the non-operational directorate also involves border security and management issues including matters related to entry points, border posts, also immigration and customs. Then, the direction in GBC Malindo will be followed up and further researched by the HLC where the HLC will give more detailed direction based on the function of the committee under it (Note 7).

GBC Malindo work also depends on the extent to which the secretariat understands the function and performs its duties effectively. In fact, the role played by the secretariat is very large and they are the ones who move the committee in GBC Malindo itself including tasks before the meeting, during the meeting and after the meeting. Before the meeting is held, the secretariat needs to hold a series of meetings between the secretariats of the two countries to get the date, agenda, and location of the meeting to be held. At the domestic level, the secretariat needs to coordinate with various agencies for the approval of financial allocations, obtain status reports from relevant agencies, coordinate the issues that will be brought into the meeting and logistical preparation tasks for the meeting. Until now, the role played by the GBC Malindo secretariat is seen to be effective due to the military influence in the structure of the GBC Malindo committee which is concerned with regimented elements (Note 8).

3.3 Political Will

Malaysia and Indonesia have placed the land border of both countries as a national interest

not only from the aspect of national sovereignty and security but also great potential and benefits to the country's economic development. During the meeting between the Prime Minister, Anwar Ibrahim, and his comrade-in-arms, the Indonesian President, Joko Widodo in 2023, he witnessed the commitment of the two leaders to resolve many matters related to border security. It not only involves disputes regarding national sovereignty, especially involving overlapping claims but also the benefits of economic development at the border that can be obtained by both countries (Note 9).

Currently, the Indonesian government has implemented the Kalimantan Economic Corridor (KEC) by focusing on the development of the regions of Kalimantan involving the implementation of mega projects with the focus on public infrastructure development and social, also economic incentives. This KEC will be the backbone of driving Indonesia's economic development. The priority at this point is the development of land and air connections to improve the quality and quantity of domestic and international connections. Apart from that, Indonesia's proposal to move the national capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan in 2024 is also expected to bring major changes to the economy, social, culture and politics in the Kalimantan region. Jakarta's focus will be more on aspects of development in the Kalimantan region, including aspects of connectivity such as the construction of ports, roads, airports, and the development of Cross-Border Posts on the land border in addition to involving the migration/movement of Indonesian residents from other islands to Kalimantan.

The relocation of Indonesia's new capital from Jakarta to East Kalimantan which is closer to Malaysia (Sarawak) is a big challenge and commitment of Malaysia in ensuring that security at the country's land border is in good condition. To begin with, the Malaysian government has allocated as much as RM1 billion to upgrade the border infrastructure in Sarawak and Sabah. This matter was also discussed in the Action Council Meeting for the Implementation of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63). Anwar Ibrahim insisted that the Malaysia Agreement 1963 (MA63) issue is one of the country's priorities to deal with. The approved allocation of RM1 billion is to help balance security with the social and economic, as well as bring prosperity to the Peninsula, Sabah, and Sarawak. This does not include existing development plans under RMK12 such as Iborneo, new Immigration, Customs, Quarantine and Security (ICQS) and others. The state governments of Sabah and Sarawak are also planning economic development at the border with the development of 'Border Towns', special economic areas and others.

3.4 Security Governance

Although this governance issue is very related to the internal issues of a country, it has a great impact on the success in managing and controlling the national borders as well as the harmony in the border security cooperation formed by the two countries. Among the issues and challenges that have been identified by the authors in this study are the structural and operational weaknesses of GBC Malindo, the gap in 'state capacity and capability' and the lack of cooperation and coordination between agencies at the domestic level.

In this regard, the authors found that there is an issue of military dominance within the GBC Malindo framework based on four of the six committees (GBC, HLC, COCC and JKLB) that

being led by the military while one committee (JPCC) is led by the police and one committee (Sosek Malindo) is led by civilians. The involvement of dominant military members in GBC Malindo's has weakened the involvement of other non-military actors. This is acknowledged by the GBC Malindo secretariat itself, which states its difficulty in obtaining cooperation and commitment from other non-military agencies in setting the meeting agenda and other matters involving meeting secretariat (Note 10). In the meantime, the secretariat's difficulty in performing a large role is also issues and challenges in the structure and work of GBC Malindo in addition to the constraints of scripted meetings and repetitive meeting agendas (Note 11).

At the same time, the 'state capacity and capability' gap that exists also affects the effectiveness of GBC Malindo. Issues involving personnel and the deployment of officers still occur where both countries face problems in deploying sufficient personnel to control the Malaysia-Indonesia land border. Aspects of border control and enforcement have become very difficult due to geographic factors and the use of technology to help border control operations which are not fully implemented. In the meantime, limited financial allocations is also an issue that is often raised by both countries in implementing the programs and activities planned in GBC Malindo (Note 12). The financial management structure of both countries needs to be reviewed, particularly in the context of national priorities and the distribution of allocations to agencies at the border including between the central and the state.

Besides, the Indonesian side also stated that the issue of 'trust deficit' among agencies occurred in the management of GBC Malindo had an impact on the effectiveness of the cooperation framework. According to them, the different administrative structures in Malaysia and Indonesia, the different focus and interests, also the problem of information sharing between the agencies of the two countries are issues and challenges that the secretariat often faces in managing GBC Malindo. From the entry point management view between Malaysia and Indonesia, the implementation of integrated border management has not yet been implemented and requires commitment and good coordination between the agencies in both countries (Note 13).

At the domestic level, the issue of cooperation and coordination between agencies still plagues NSC as the central agency responsible for coordinating all issues related to the management of national border security. Among the coordination issues identified in the management of Malaysia-Indonesia land border security are coordination issue in the operational areas and arrests which involving agencies at the border, as well as the issue of coordination in the entry points and ICQS involving the movement of people and goods. Currently, the two issues involving cooperation and coordination between agencies are often raised by the secretariats of both countries, which to some extent has had an impact in the cross-border crime increment at the Malaysia-Indonesia land border.

3.5 Societal Integration

The formation of the political border between Malaysia and Indonesia has had an impact on the national identity and cultural identity of the people on the border of the two countries.

With the formation of borders, social life in border communities is not only limited to interactions with the community within the country but also involves interactions and social bonds that cross the borders of the two countries (Yusten Karulus & Maine Suadik 2010). Such activities, which were previously considered legal, are now labelled as smuggling, and further pose an existential security threat to both countries. The lack of legal entry points and the distance factor make the border communities in both countries prefer to go through rat roads to get necessities and meet relatives.

The economic status of border communities is still low and vulnerable to the involvement of cross-border crime, particularly involving invasion and smuggling. Towns on Malaysia and Indonesia border is often in remote areas and are also associated with backwardness and low-income and poor residents. The need to get easier and cheaper necessities in towns near the border causes border communities in Indonesia to be more attracted crossing the border to get those needs (Julie Tay Gek Hsia & Gusni Saat, 2020). There is informal cross-border trade between Sabah-Sarawak and Kalimantan where the smuggling of goods in the border area is a phenomenon that continues until now. Smuggling activities usually involve subsidized goods such as daily necessities including cooking oil, onions, fresh chicken, coconuts, and petroleum products such as gas and petrol that often occur at the Malaysia-Indonesia border.

The role and contribution of communities at the border in improving security at the border is currently seen as very low, not to mention the tendency of communities at the Kalimantan side that cross the border illegally to do social and economic activities. Indeed, communities on the border have a certain influence that is formed through social identity (race, culture, ideology, family) and this social identity expands beyond the political boundaries of the two countries. The cross-border crime activities carried out by the border community are due to the people's lack of knowledge about the issue. Lack of awareness occurs due to attitudes and perceptions among border communities who feel that cross-border activities are not a criminal matter in addition to their culture which considers smuggling as a source of income (Hadi Suratman et al., 2020).

There are efforts by the governments of both countries to involve border communities in helping to curb these illegal activities. Among them, an awareness program for the border community to be the eyes and ears of the Malaysian side to provide cross-border crime information (Note 14), while in Indonesia, its citizens are urged to report any illegal behavior at the Malaysia-Indonesia land border (Note 15). The border community also cooperates by getting involved in the community programs implemented by the governments of both countries (Note 16). Another collaboration that was signed are the creation of a forum and dialogue by the government for border communities to express their views, needs and suggestions, also as a platform for the government to take input from the people in improving the system existing workflow (Note 17). However, the involvement of border communities in programs and activities, especially Sosek Malindo, is still low compared to the role they can play.

Therefore, both countries need to formulate strategies by increasing programs and activities

that involve border communities, especially in Sosek Malindo. This is because, in Sosek Malindo, the state and provincial governments can play a greater role due to their closeness with border communities, as well as better understand their problems and needs in improving the socio-economic aspects of the border. Although there are many programs and activities implemented by Sosek Malindo to improve that aspect, the direct involvement of border communities is very little compared to the number of communities on the Malaysia-Indonesia land border. At the same time, the government needs to build a close relationship with the community at the border to gain their trust in the government's commitment to improve security at the border (Note 18).

3.6 Border Prosperity

GBC Malindo which initially focused on security has evolved towards economic and social development as an agenda to enable it to remain relevant. It can be implemented by developing the border region of Malaysia so that it can generate prosperity for the border residents throughout the states of Sabah and Sarawak, as well as some areas in Kalimantan, Indonesia by creating a balanced security and economic environment. The establishment of Sosek Malindo through the improvement of SA1984 proves that GBC Malindo sees the importance of social and economic aspects, especially those involving communities on the border, which should be improved.

The establishment of Sosek Malindo on September 18, 1984 was an effort by both countries to improve the social well-being and living standards of the people in the border areas, especially on the Malaysia-Indonesia land border. Through Sosek Malindo, economic development at the border is expanded not only at the central level, but the role of the state is also emphasized to ensure that socio-economic development can be well integrated. Many initiatives and programs have been implemented and succeeded with the objective of ensuring border security from the socio-economic development aspect of the demarcation.

Under Sosek Malindo, there are technical teams which are divided into three main areas, namely the Social and Cultural Technical Team, the Economic, Trade and Communication Technical Team and the Security and Border Management Technical Team. These technical teams will mobilize prosperity at the border in various fields including tourism, culture, health, education, youth development and sports, also the management of entry points and facilitation of cross-border trade (Note 19).

Malaysia indeed places development at the border as one of the approaches and strategies in curbing security threats at the border. This can be seen when the country was facing the communist threat in the 1970s and 1980s when Malaysia introduced the concept of security and development program (KESBAN) which combines security and development in the national security policy. This includes infrastructure development involving the construction of roads to facilitate security personnel in controlling the border. This benefit is also felt by the community at the border when other facilities such as health (health clinics) and education (schools) are also developed for the use of the community at the border. A different situation occurs in Indonesia where the government did not pay attention to development at the border until it changed when President Jokowi ruled in 2014. The development of border

infrastructure is seen to be improving with the development and upgrading of the National Cross Border Post and the highway network for support the development of a new capital city in East Kalimantan (Note 20).

In the meantime, to facilitate cross-border movement by communities at the border, particularly involving social and trade activities, the two countries signed the Border Crossing Agreement (BCA) in 1984 and before that the Border Trade Agreement (BTA) in 1970. Through Sosek Malindo, the need to improve the BCA and BTA has become a priority for both countries specially to facilitate the movement in and out of communities and to improve cross-border trade activities at the Malaysia-Indonesia land border.

4. Finding

Based on the results of the analysis using the CBSC Model, the authors found that the effectiveness in border security cooperation through the GBC Malindo framework to manage and control the Malaysia-Indonesia land border, shown as “achieved partial CBSC”. This is based on GBC Malindo achievements against four components namely legal framework, government commitment, border institutions and border prosperity. While the other two components have not been achieved, namely security governance and community integration. A summary of the effectiveness analysis results is as table below:

Table 2. Summary of the Effectiveness Analysis Results

No.	Components in the CBSC Model	Analysis of GBC Malindo	Description
1.	<i>Legislature</i>	✓	Has a strong legal framework through SA1972/1984.
2.	<i>Political Will</i>	✓	Recognized as the main cooperation platform in border security.
3.	<i>Border Institution</i>	✓	A clear structure and movement of work through the committee.
4.	<i>Security Governance</i>	✗	A gap in ‘state capacity and capability’ as well as a lack of cooperation and coordination between agencies.
5.	<i>Societal Integration</i>	✗	Community involvement in GBC Malindo programs and activities is still low.
6.	<i>Border Prosperity</i>	✓	The expansion of functions from security aspects to social and economic development at the border.
Results/Levels		“Achieving Partial CBSC”	

Source: Author’s finding.

Therefore, the results of the study show that the cooperation relationship between Malaysia and Indonesia within the framework of GBC Malindo to improve security at the

Malaysia-Indonesia land border has almost fulfilled the overall border security cooperation. However, due to issues/gaps in governance, safety and community integration has become a challenge to the effectiveness of the GBC Malindo framework.

5. Conclusion

Overall, GBC Malindo is effective in playing its role in managing the border and dealing with security issues at the Malaysia-Indonesia land border through comprehensive border security cooperation. This matter is evident based on the creation of a legal framework (legislature), the establishment of a border institution (border institution), the government's commitment (political will) through very committed efforts and support, as well as border prosperity through the exploration of new cooperation, the implementation of economic and social development, also by addressing security issues through border security cooperation. However, it has not been successfully addressed in the aspect of security governance, where there are still many issues that could not be resolved and need to be given attention by the government, especially the leaders and secretariat of GBC Malindo, as well as in societal integration when the level of community involvement at the border is still low in government decisions/initiatives, mostly through the activities implemented by SOSEK Malindo.

Acknowledgments

The authors express their appreciation and thanks to the Faculty of Social Sciences & Humanities, National University of Malaysia and International Journal of Social Science Research, Macrothink Institute who helped and accepted the publication of this article.

Authors contributions

Mohd Ikbal Mohd Huda was responsible for study design and revised it. Shahrizal Sa'ad was responsible for data collection and drafted the manuscript. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript, as well as contributed equally to the study.

Funding

This research received no specific financial support.

Competing interests

The authors have no competing interest to declare.

Informed consent

Obtained.

Ethics approval

The Publication Ethics Committee of the Macrothink Institute. The journal's policies adhere to the Core Practices established by the Committee on Publication Ethics (COPE).

Provenance and peer review

Not commissioned, externally double-blind peer reviewed.

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data is not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.

Data sharing statement

No additional data is available.

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Notes

Note 1. The Working Committees formed under the GBC Malindo based on SA1972/1984 are the Coordinated Operations Control Committee (COCC), the Joint Training Committee (JKLB), the Joint Police Cooperation Committee (JPCC) and the Socio-Economic Malaysia-Indonesia (Sosek Malindo).

- Note 2. NSC Directive No. 4 (National Land Border Security Management).
- Note 3. 42nd GBC Malindo Flyer.
- Note 4. NSC Directive No. 4 (National Land Border Security Management).
- Note 5. National Security Policy (NSP) 2021-2025.
- Note 6. Public Safety and Order Policy (2019).
- Note 7. Mat Zain, A. (2023, January 17). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 8. Md Saad, R. (2022, July 14). Personal communication [Personal interview].
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- Note 11. Ishak, H. (2022, July 18). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 12. Mohamed Said, A. (2022, July 18). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 13. Nur Syahrizal. (2022, August 7). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 14. “Society as eyes and ears”, NSC Official Website, May 9, 2022.
- Note 15. “Explanation on the Law of the Republic Indonesia Number 6/2011 on Immigration”, President of the Republic Indonesia.
- Note 16. Mat Zain, A. (2023, January 17). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 17. Md Saad, R. (2022, July 14). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 18. Md Saad, R. (2022, July 14). Personal communication [Personal interview].
- Note 19. Land Border Management Division, NSC.
- Note 20. Shaiful Azni, N. M. (2023, January 25). Personal communication [Personal interview].

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